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Glossary 
ATO 
er 
CIF 
DFID 
FOB 
!FAT 
Alternative Trade Organisation 
Conservation International. A US based conservation organisation. 
Cost Insurance .and Freight. The point at which a commodity has 
arrived in the port of destination. 
UK Government Department for International Development 
Free on Board. The point at which a commodity has been loaded on to 
a ship at the port of origin. 
International Federation of Alternative Traders 
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Introduction 
DFID's Forestry Research Programme is funding a three-year project to research the 
role that ethical trade can play in improving the lives of forest dependent people in 
developing countries. The project asks fundamental questions about whether such 
trade can deliver appropriate benefits, how effectively current ethical initiatives 
operate, and what practical steps can be taken to improve performance. 
The research summarised in this report forms one of three comparative studies that 
will address the questions of how current ethical trade practitioners operate in the 
forest products context and whether the trade brings incremental benefits to forest 
dependent people. It examines ethical trade of brazil nuts in the context of Candela, 
an alternative trade organisation operating in Peru. Evidence was gathered on the 
type of financial improvements that Candela brings to brazil nut collectors, the size of 
these benefits, and how the organisation manages to deliver them. The research also 
analyses the international part of the ethical brazil nut trading chain and draws 
conclusions on the appropriateness of the commodity for ethical trade. The basis for 
the study is a comparison with the conventional brazil nut trade. 
A separate study conducted by a social development expert examines the impact that 
ethical trading has had on the brazil nut collectors in Peru. 
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Part 1. Ethical and Conventional International Trade in Brazil Nuts 
1.1 Overview of the Edible Nut Trade 
The edible nut trade comprises a group of primarily tree crops, grown in both tropical 
and temperate climatic regions. Hazelnuts, groundnuts (peanuts), almonds, and 
cashew nuts dominate the trade, with other varieties, such as coconut (desiccated), 
walnuts, macadamia nuts and pecan nuts, also of significance. 
All these products are to a large extent substitutable in their end uses, and can be 
consumed directly as "cocktail" nuts or in mixed ingredient snacks, or as food 
ingredients in the confectionery and bakery trade. 
Most edible nuts of inferior quality can be crushed to produce oil and oil cake/oilmeal 
or used directly for non-human consumption as birdfeed. 
The major products entering world trade are as follows: 
Table 1. Edible nuts- major producers/volume (shelled) 
Edible Nuts Volume 
Major Castaneros (metric tonnes) 
Hazelnuts Turkey and Italy 136,000 
Peanuts USA, India, Argentina 731 ,000 
Almonds USA and Spain 123,000 
Cashews India and Brazil 59,000 
Walnuts USA and China 61,000 
Coconut Philippines and Sri Lanka 106,000 
Brazil nuts Brazil, Bolivia and Peru 20,000 
Source: Dominguez, 1994 and Man Producten, Rotterdam 1999. 
These figures illustrate that brazil nuts, at around 1.62 % of total volume, are a 
relatively minor constituent ofthe world edible nut trade. 
International edible nut prices are primarily influenced by supply and demand factors 
and there is an absence of commodity exchanges, auctions and futures markets to act 
as price determinant points. The trade is purely in the physical commodities without 
futures exchanges. The potential for high prices tends to be limited due to the 
substitutability of alternative edible nuts in their end products. 
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1.2 Brazil Nut Production and Export 
The latest production estimate of the major brazil nut producers, unshelled in metric 
tonnes, is as follows: 
Brazil -
Bolivia-
Peru 
Total 
7,800 mt 
10,000 mt 
2,200 mt1 
20,000 mt 
The bulk of production is exported, with less than approximately 3 % used for 
domestic conswnption. 
Accurate production figures are notoriously difficult to obtain and the trade relies on 
import statistics for both in-shell and kernels to give an indication of production 
trends. Trade calculations are usually based on 35% maximum yield of kernels to in-
shell nuts. 
1.3 Uses ofBrazil Nuts 
Brazil nuts are mainly traded as kernels (i.e. shelled) and used primarily as a food 
ingredient in the confectionery business (particularly in chocolate bars) in the bakery 
trade (cakes and biscuits), and in health foods. They are also used in snacks such as 
packs of dried fruit and nuts, and mixed nuts. The "midget" grade shelled kernel is 
found especially useful as a confectionery ingredient. There is also a traditional 
seasonal market for in-shell Brazil nuts during the Christmas and Thanksgiving 
periods in the UK and the USA. 
Brazil nut oil is used locally as a cooking oil, for lubrication and for lighting lamps. 
Efforts are also being made to promote the oil in the export market as an exotic 
ingredient in food and cosmetic products. 
1.4 Consumption 
The main areas of conswnption are Europe and North America. 
1( 
1997 Brazil Bolivia Peru Chile & Total 
Others 
UK 2045 mt 3110 mt 181 mt 399mt 5,695 mt 
Netherlands 356mt 280mt 134mt 1,584 mt 2,354 mt 
USA 6466mt 1965 mt 593 mt 581 mt 9,605 mt 
Canada 493 mt 307 mt Nil 473 mt 1,273 mt 
-- -
Source: USDA 
1 This figure is disputed by Candela Peru. Candela claims that exports are usually over twice the 
stated figure . 
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1.5 Prices 
As with edible nuts in general, the international price of Brazil nuts is determined by 
basic supply and demand and does not come under the influence of commodity 
auctions, exchanges or futures markets. There is no hedging mechanism available to 
suppliers and importers. The trade is therefore exclusively in the physical commodity 
at flat prices (and not in differential prices that reflect the value attached to nuts from 
different origins). Consequently, any imbalance in supply and demand tends to have 
an immediate impact on prices. However, there is no excessive speculative element 
that causes large and unjustified price swings, such as often occurs in cocoa and 
coffee markets. 
As a consequence of substitutability, brazil nut prices are affected by prices of other 
nuts. For instance, oversupply of walnuts tends to cause brazil nut prices to drop, as 
buyers exploit the cheapness of walnuts and purchase fewer brazil nuts. 
As with many commodities, yearly price trends tend to be cyclical. Low international 
prices eventually result in collectors abandoning the harvest2 and precipitating a 
shortage in supply, thereby creating higher prices and an incentive to re-enter the 
trade. 
While the production of Brazil nuts is normally adequate to meet demand, supply is 
inelastic due to the length oftime (up to 30 years) that it takes for the trees to mature. 
Most other types of comparable tree nuts mature in 5 to 10 years. 
Shipping usually occurs during the rainy season, because much internal transport is by 
navigable river only. However, supply is often affected by climatic conditions, 
particularly heavy rains, which slow the rate of the harvest and increase the 
percentage of post harvest losses and poor quality nuts due to mould. Heavy rains 
during the harvest season also put pressure on infrastructure, particularly, the 
condition of roads leading from the harvesting locations in the forest to the processing 
plants, secondary stores and shipment ports. A longer-term influence on the supply 
situation is the destruction of the rain forest through logging and clearing for 
agricultural development. 
Demand and price movements tend to be seasonal, with unshelled demand 
particularly high during the Christmas season. However, demand is elastic because 
Brazil nuts can easily be substituted, particularly in snacks, by comparable nuts such 
as almonds and hazelnuts. Brazil nuts are often considered the poor relations within 
the edible nut trade. 
There is also a discount in the market of approximately 0.4 US cents/lb for Peruvian 
Brazil nuts compared with nuts of Brazilian and Bolivian origin, which are perceived 
as being of superior quality with a more consistent availability and shipment 
performance record. The trade currently views Peru as an origin oflast resort. 
2 However, many gatherers, at least in Peru, are almost entirely dependent on brazil nuts for their 
income. Such people are unlikely to abandon the activity (pers. Comm. Candela Peru) 
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The outlook for Brazil nut prices in general is favourable because output in the 
leading producer country, Brazil, is declining due to high costs of extraction and the 
destruction of the rain forest. While Bolivia is increasingly filling the role of leading 
producer, rapid expansion is constrained by lack of credit and difficulties meeting the 
strict quality requirements of the major importing countries, particularly those within 
the EU. 
Another positive factor for future prices is Brazil nut's image, together with other 
edible nuts, as a natural, healthy, protein rich food increasingly favoured by 
consumers. Against this, there is a persistently poor perception among buyers of 
brazil nut food safety. Unless meaures are taken to reassure the buyers, brazil nuts' 
share of the nut market may decline. 
1.6 Stakeholders in the International Marketing Chain 
The international brazil nut marketing chain is represented by the following diagram 
(-H- indicates where value is added). The capital letters, e.g. FOB (Free on Board: 
The point at which the commodity has been loaded onto the ship at the port of origin), 
indicate key pricing points, with recent indicative market prices, as value is added 
along the marketing chain: 
!Exporter§ 
US$ 1.35/lb, FOB 
E3j Shipping 
Marine insurance 
Finance (Banks/ International trading companies) 
Braking 
OCIDPoite!S] 
183 
Warehousing/landing costs 
Trading margins. 
tF ood PrOCessors I wholesalers/Retaileij 
US$ 1.50/lb, CIF* 
US$1.60/lb ex-store** 
* CIF: Cost Insurance and Freight refers to the point at which the commodity has 
arrived in the destination port 
** Ex-store refers to the point at which the commodity arrives in the buyer's or 
trader's warehouse. 
According to trade sources, about 15 % of the price (US$ 0.25/lb in the above 
example) is added to value between FOB and ex dock (when the commodity has been 
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unloaded at the destination port). This figure represents freight, insurance, interest, 
weight losses, terminal handling charges, customs, import duties (if any), and 
warehouse costs, brokers' commission and trading profits. It is considered that traders 
would not operate for less than a net profit margin of 3 % of the ex dock price. It 
should also be noted that most large traders tend to be resellers in the market 
operating from "long" positions (they hold inventory) and not necessarily trading on a 
"back to back" basis (where all trading operations are concluded simultaneously). 
1. 7 The Brazil Nut Ethical Trade Experience 
The following case study of TWIN trading's involvement in marketing Peruvian 
brazil nuts highlights the constraints of trading edible nuts at the international level 
using the principles of fairtrade. 
TWIN Trading identified the potential for fairtrade initiatives in Peruvian Brazil nuts 
in the late 1980's and started working with the Peruvian NGO, Candela, in 1988/89. 
Candela operates processing plants in Puerto Maldonado and buys Brazil nuts from 
collectors in the Madre de Dios region. TWIN's usual practice is to provide rural 
credit, practical support and advice (particularly on handling and quality control) to 
growers/collectors at the start of the marketing chain. However, in this instance the 
support function was performed by Candela. TWIN's role was limited to buying the 
processed and packed nuts FOB Puerto Callao, arranging credit facilities for Candela 
and advising on nut processing. They had about 10 clients covering "Fair Trade" 
buyers such as OXFAM and Traidcraft, health food shops, and mainstream food 
ingredient users. However, the volumes that Candela has sold into fair trade markets 
have never been high, typically no more than two containers a year. 
TWIN Trading decided to withdraw from this enterprise at the beginning of 1999 for 
the following reasons: 
• The operation did not satisfy TWIN's primary strategic aim of working with poor 
and marginalised peoples at the start of the marketing chain. 
• Candela, in TWIN's opinion, was unable to provide the collectors with the support 
that they needed and consequently quality was, at least initially, poor. Candela 
admits that quality was a problem but disagrees that the cause was insufficient 
support to collectors. Quality was in Candela's direct control. 
• The lack of scale in its operations and poor quality put TWIN at a disadvantage 
compared with European traders selling into the mainstream food ingredient 
market, where higher volumes are required. Additionally, TWIN's inability to 
source from alternative origins and the substitutability of brazil nuts put TWIN at 
a disadvantage to the large trading companies in the market place. 
• The "Fair Trade" and health food shop markets were too small to justify the 
operation. 
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To solve these problems would have involved a major fund raising effort and TWIN 
decided that this project was not a priority within their current overall strategic 
objectives. 
TWIN's trading experience indicated that very few innovations can be made to 
differentiate ethical from conventional trading methods at the international level. The 
scope for shortening the marketing chain from FOB onwards is limited to the 
possible elimination of some brokers and dealers operating on a CIF/ex-store basis. 
When considering the margins taken by brokers and traders it should be noted that 
their presence in the market is often welcomed by end users as they usually offer a 
range of competing origins and substitutable edible nuts and provide the market with 
a degree ofliquidity (credit). Another factor in the cost equation is the cheaper freight 
rates that larger dealers buying FOB can realise through economies of scale, thereby 
enhancing their competitive position and profit margins. 
Candela has responded to this analysis by writing, "The alternative trading chain 
stretches from the producer to the consumer, with all the players in middle required 
for a specific purpose. For us, this is a cornerstone of the analysis of the brazil nut 
experience. If parts of the chain do not work, the players in the middle only have 
limited effectiveness, always trying to do what they can according to the code of 
practice while ensuring the survival of the organisation." 
Part 2. The Peruvian Ethical and Conventional Export Trading 
Chain 
2.1 The Peruvian Economy 
By Latin American standards, Peru is a middle income country. Evidence of this is 
provided in Table 3, which gives 1998 GNP per capita for Peru and its immediate 
neighbours. 
Table 3. GNP Ratios 
1998 GNP per National debt 
Capita in US$ as%ofGNP 
Peru 2,460 53% 
Bolivia 1,000 68% 
Brazil 4,570 28% 
Chile 4,810 45% 
Ecuador 1,530 87% 
Source: World Bank 
However, Peru's wealth is so poorly distributed that approximately 50% of the 
population live in poverty (DFID Country Strategy Paper). The situation is even 
worse in the rural sierra region, where two thirds of the households are deemed poor. 
Peru's level of indebtedness is not particularly large by regional standards. The third 
column of Table 3 gives national debt as a percentage of GNP for Peru and its 
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neighbours. The ratio gives an indication of ability to service loans. Clearly Bolivia's 
and Ecuador's debt burdens are much greater than Peru's. 
Peru's rate of inflation in 1998 was 7% while the nominal rate of interest was 15%. 
The real rate of interest (nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation - a reflection 
of the actual cost of borrowing) at 8% is not unusually high in the region, and, given 
that exchange rates have been stable over recent years, the export business 
environment is reasonably favourable. 
2.2 The Brazil Nut Industry in Madre de Dios 
The province of Madre de Dios lies in the south-east corner of Peru. It is dominated 
by tropical rainforest and broad silt laden rivers, both of which provide key 
exploitable resources for the local people. Road communications with the rest of the 
country are difficult and often non-existent during the rainy season. The only reliable 
means of inter-province transport is by air. 
Approximately 27,000 people (38% of the population) in Madre de Dios depend 
directly or indirectly on the brazil nut trade. This figure includes: 
• Some 1,000 castaneros and their families. A castanero is a person who holds a 
concession from the Peruvian government to extract brazil nuts from a fixed area 
of forest. 
• Barriqueros: men contracted by the castanero to collect and split the brazil nut 
"coconuts", and to transport the 80kg sacks of nuts from the forest to the shipping 
point (on the river or main road). 
• Hauliers, who transport the brazil nuts, by river or road, from the zones where the 
nuts are produced to the main towns of Madre de Dios. For concessions with river 
access, this is principally to the provincial capital, Puerto Maldonado, and for 
those with road access, to Planch6n, Alegria, Mavila or Alerta. 
• Workers and administrative staff within the companies. 
• "Shellers": women contracted by the castaneros or trading companies to shell the 
brazil nuts. 
• Traders of all types, from the habilitadores (individuals who lend money to the 
castaneros to enable them to finance their work in the forest, in exchange for the 
promise of their future brazil nut supply) to acopiadores (collectors, individuals 
who work independently or under contract to the companies to buy up brazil nuts 
from the forest region); rescatistas ("debt collectors", individuals who collect 
brazil nuts which have already been promised through earlier loans); and even 
shop keepers (in grocery stores, who provide goods on credit, again in return for 
brazil nuts). 
The brazil nut trade drives a large part of the economic life of the region. This is not 
only because it injects cash into the local economy, but also because, unlike the other 
predominantly commercial activities (such as timber and gold), brazil nuts are one of 
the few resources that remain under the control of poor people (who are, in general, 
farmers and small scale poultry keepers). 
Brazil nuts have become the principal factor that prevents the poorer members of the 
population of this isolated province from becoming even more impoverished. The 
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trade is also the principal factor that restricts the advance of deforestation into the 
virgin forests of the Amazon. Once forest land has been logged, poor soils prevent 
large scale agriculture and livestock ranching, leaving subsistence agriculture as the 
only viable activity. 
There are 14 companies who buy brazil nuts in Madre de Dios (company names 
appear in Appendix 1 ). The rate at which companies enter and exit the industry is 
high. For example, this year E & F Traders (a subsidiary ofBackus & Johnston, the 
first castanero of bottled beer in Peru) is restricted to recovering outstanding debts, 
while Premium Trading has left the market altogether. In their place, two new 
companies have appeared: Cereales and El Muelle (created by two ex-employees of 
the company La Selva3). 
This high turnover is the result of two factors : 
• lack of knowledge among new companies of the dynamics of the brazil nut 
industry 
• lack of fixed assets on the part of some companies. 
These factors are discussed below. 
Lack of Knowledge of the Brazil Nut Trade 
Many of the new companies, and even some of the more established companies who 
contract new personnel in the zone, are unaware of one of the fundamental elements 
of the trade: Castaneros generally suffer high levels of indebtedness. 
This point requires a brief explanation of the problems associated with brazil nut 
collection in Madre de Dios. As in all forest zones of Peru the land and brazil nut 
trees belong to the Peruvian State4• The State authorises concessions for periods of 
between 2-10 years to private individuals in order that they work the brazil nut 
resource. In return, the State receives an annual levy that is proportional to the 
declared volume of brazil nuts obtained from the concession. This, in turn, is 
proportional to the size of the concession, which can vary from 500 to 2000 hectares5. 
In general, the majority of castaneros are already burdened with a history of debt of 
which they cannot easily rid themselves. This is the consequence of the lack of 
alternative income generating activities. Many new companies do not understand this 
important feature of the industry. In order to acquire nuts in the quantities needed for 
export, such companies have to enter into the system of providing loans in exchange 
for the promise of future supply. The castaneros, under pressure from their 
3 This is a situation which has occured previously on many occasions, and has given rise to the creation 
of companies such as Jaramillo and Bonilla, among others. 
4 This differs from the situation in Bolivia, for example, where land is owned by individuals. 
5 Recent studies have shown that the offic ial size of the concessions does not always coincide with their 
actual size. For example, one concession of 500ha contained only 237ha of land which was actually 
exploited. To address this discrepancy, the Ministry of Agriculture commissioned a survey to calculate 
the actual areas of the brazil nut territories which were being exploited. Concession holders were 
charged a substantial amount of money for this activity, despite the fact that they are not the owners of 
the land which, as explained previously, remains the property of the State. This situation generated 
some controversy. Furthermore, the work was of insufficiently high quality to provide reliable results. 
12 
immediate financial needs, take advantage of the appearance of these newcomers, and 
often make them suffer for their lack of experience. In all other aspects of the trade, 
companies are in a much stronger bargaining position than the castaneros. 
The longer established companies already know who is good at repaying, and who are 
the debt defaulters. The new companies do not possess this important knowledge and 
enter into the trade with a significant handicap. There is virtually no company in 
Madre de Dios that does not have delinquent debtor portfolios dating, in some cases, 
from up to 5 years earlier. Continued business viability depends on managing these 
debts adequately. The companies need to balance the risk of increasing the capital 
tied up in outstanding loans, against their need to establish and increase their 
participation in the market. 
Non-existence of Fixed Assets 
The high proportion of companies leaving the market reflects the fact that the majority 
of companies have few fixed assets, often possessing only small rented premises with 
limited equipment, and conditions that are less than optimal for storing the nuts. The 
decision to withdraw from the trade in times of financial hardship, and dismiss their 
buyers (who, in reality, may be only one person), is therefore easy. 
2.3 Candela Peru 
Candela Peru is an alternative trade organisation (ATO) and active member of the 
International Federation of Alternative Traders (IFAT), whose activities are run on the 
concepts and values of fair trade. Our analysis focuses on this organisation and a 
comparison of its performance with other commercial and strictly private institutions 
involved in the brazil nut trade. 
Candela Peru has established the following product lines: 
• Brazil nuts 
• Brazil nut oil 
• Handmade candles 
• Pecan nuts 
Its activities are centred on the export ofbrazil nuts. However a significant proportion 
of the brazil nuts collected in Madre de Dios do not meet the requirements of external 
markets. To address this problem, Candela is producing brazil nut oil, manufactured 
from 3rd grade (split) brazil nuts. While these nuts do have an external market, their 
unit value is very low and therefore profits are sma116. Further processing into brazil 
nut oil yields a much greater profit margin, though so far, the market has been small. 
Whole nuts, which for reasons of poor appearance were not of export quality, used to 
be sold to wholesalers in Lima who introduced them into the national market for 
domestic consumption. The price paid by these traders was very low and Candela 
6 This is explained by the fact that the importers take advantage of the poor quality of the residual 
produce by paying a lower price. 
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made an evaluation of the profitability of initiating direct marketing to the 
confectionery and cake industries in Lima. The evaluation was positive, but pointed 
to the need to incorporate other, complementary products such as grated coconut, 
raisins, cherries, apricots, candied fruits, sesame, aniseed, and fruits in syrup, which 
were also consumed by this segment of the market. In this market, Candela competes 
with most of the other export companies including La Selva (which mainly operates in 
the city of Arequipa, on the southern coast of the country), El Basque, and Rovalex. 
Candela has also developed the manufacture and marketing of candles made from the 
natural casks ("coconuts") that contain the brazil nuts and which otherwise would be 
left to rot on the forest floor. While many local crafts people in Puerto Maldonado 
were manufacturing ashtrays, sugar bowls and other ornaments with these coconuts, 
production had never been large scale. Currently, Candela Peni purchases 
approximately 50,000 of these coconuts annually, thus generating an additional 
income for some castaneros (though the supply could still increase considerably). 
The candles are manufactured in Lima. 
In the past, the organisation had a much wider range of handicrafts, and worked with 
groups of handicraft producers from cities in the interior of the country. However, 
three years ago the company directors decided to concentrate on brazil nuts and 
products derived from them. 7 
2.4 Candela's Performance Compared with its Local Competitors 
This section examines the incremental financial and capacity-building benefits that 
Candela delivers to castaneros. 
2.4.1 General Perception of Candela. 
Very few castaneros in the region have heard of the concept of ethical trade, and even 
fewer feel that an organisation that shares and practices such principles exists in their 
locality. Despite the fact that many castaneros recognise Candela as a friendly 
organisation (something which was not easy to achieve on Candela's part), they do 
not associate the company's commitment and actions with ethical trade. 
At present, opinions about Candela Peni are varied. The company has not managed to 
project an image of a true "partner organisation" to the majority of other players with 
which it interacts. It is, however, well established as a serious entity within the group 
of institutional players (principally other NGOs, state and government organisations 
and leaders of grass roots organisations). 
It has yet to consolidate this image among the nucleus of private companies, or among 
the region's large group of castaneros. 
7 Transferring the entire network of organised craft workers to another Peruvian alternative trade 
organisation: ClAP. 
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2.4.2 Purchase Price 
Although Candela Peru has in the past sold approximately 10% of its output to ATOs 
such as TWIN and Oxfam Trading, their purchase price in the market has not differed 
significantly from that of the other private companies. Candela has also sold most of 
its output to commercial "for profit" companies such as Global Organics and 
Sunshine Nuts. 
In 1999, Candela Peru increased the size of its operations, thereby entering the 
mainstream international market. Candela's export earnings were henceforth 
determined entirely by the international price. 
- --- - - -- - _z-
September 1998 
Local Price 
Candela Peru 1.74 
Other companies 1.70 
Source: PROMPEX and Field Work 
Authors' interpretation. 
FOB Price 
3.45 
3.15 
July 1999 
Local Price FOB Price 
1.50 3.12 
1.65 3.12 
According to the information contained in Table 4, when the price on the external 
market was significantly higher for Candela (9.52% higher), as occurred in September 
1998, this premium was not entirely reflected in local prices (only 2.35% higher). 
When the price on the external market was similar for both Candela and its private 
companies competitors (July 1999), the internal price paid by Candela was apparently 
below the average price offered by its competitors. 
Candela disputes these figures. It claims that its FOB price in 1998 was on average 
US$3.32, just 5.4% higher than the average received by other companies. The 
difference, Candela claims, is only minimally accounted for by revenue earned from 
fairtrade buyers. The major difference comes from Candela's export strategies of 
selling some of its nuts in shell (a small but apparently lucrative market) and of not 
exporting chipped and broken nuts. 
With some justification, Candela also takes issue with the July 1999 local buying 
price quoted in Table 4. Why, Candela asks, would a castanero sell to a company that 
offers a lower price than its neighbouring competitors? 
Measuring prices in the dynamic and complicated environment of Puerto Maldonado 
brazil nut trading is always going to be contentious and lead to differences of 
interpretation. The resource limitations of our research meant that we were unable to 
measure prices consistently over time, thereby revealing a true pattern. We therefore 
conclude nothing from the price analysis summarised in Table 4. Instead we merely 
note that there is no evidence to suggest that Candela has performed better than its 
competitors in delivering a higher proportion of its FOB price to castaneros. 
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2.4.3 Conditions of Credit 
Credit is a crucial element within the trading system because almost all castaneros 
have to resort to some form of external credit in order to be able to initiate their 
harvest. 
The principal sources of credit are: 
1. CREDISMAD 
This institution, which specialises in credit for small scale castaneros and is a 
local initiative with external funding, has the aim of creating an alternative source 
of credit for the castaneros (alternative to the conventional companies). 
The characteristics ofthe credit are as follows: 
• A monthly interest rate of2.5% 
• Loans are in US dollars 
• Maximum period of repayment of 6 months 
• Repayment of the principal is made in cash and not in kind (brazil nuts) 
• Various types of loan guarantees (depending on the degree oftrust established) 
including physical assets and concession contracts 
• Daily arrears, proportional and cumulative according to the delay in repayment 
2. Candela Peni 
Credit terms are as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
No interest is charged 
There is no fixed repayment period 
No cumulative daily arrears are charged 
Credit is initially in Soles, with arrears payable in US dollars 
There is an agreement to pay in kind (brazil nuts) for the service of shelling 
The selling price is not fixed in advance, but is according to the market price 
at the moment of sale 
The contract for the concession is required as a guarantee 
3. Processing Companies and Traders 
The characteristics of their credit are as follows : 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
They do not charge interest or arrears; neither do they have a fixed time limit 
for repayment (in kind) 
Credit is not tied to US dollars 
Repayment must be in unshelled brazil nuts 
In some cases the price to be paid for the nuts is fixed in advance, while in 
others it is not 
In some (but not all) cases, assets must be pledged as a guarantee 
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4. Export Companies (These companies vary from case 3 companies because they 
do not engage in shelling brazil nuts) 
The characteristics ofthe credit offered are as follows: 
• They do not charge credit or arrears; neither do they have a fixed time limit for 
repayment (in kind) 
• Credit is not tied to the US dollar 
• Repayment must be in shelled brazil nuts 
• The price to be paid for the nuts is almost always fixed in advance 
• In some (but not all) cases, assets must be pledged as a guarantee 
Candela Peni offers credit with the most favourable terms and conditions. This is 
tending to put pressure on the other companies to improve the conditions they offer, in 
order to compete. 
The advantages offered by Candela stem from three critical points: 
• Compared to CREDISMAD, the main advantage is that the debt does not increase 
daily if, for some unforeseen circumstance, the castaneros cannot cover the entire 
loan with income from the current season8. 
• Compared to processing companies and traders, the principal advantage is that 
they do not require the loan to be repaid in unshelled brazil nuts. Castaneros can 
greatly increase their profits if they can sell shelled nuts (refer to appendix 2 for 
details) 
• Finally, in comparison with the export companies, the principal advantage is that 
the price is not fixed in advance, but is based on the market price at the time of 
sale. In general, the other companies, in "agreeing" ("forcing" would be more 
exact) a fixed price with the castaneros at the time when money is lent, set this 
well below the prevailing market price in Madre de Dios (around 20% lower on 
average). 
On the negative side, Candela is known for its inflexibility in recovering overdue 
debts. Countering this, Candela claim that they are trying to build financial 
responsibility among castaneros. Furthermore, some of their bad debts date back to 
1995. In a few cases, Candela is considering taking legal action to recover their 
money. 
2.4.4 Transparency of Transactions 
Lack of transparency occurs in both directions: transparency on the part of the 
companies towards the castaneros, and transparency of the castaneros towards the 
companies. These problems are a reflection of the fragile web of relationships that 
exists within the brazil nut trade. 
8 It is important to remember that, in general, the brazil nut castaneros have no other source of income 
for the rest of the year, at least, of comparable magnitude. Some 67% of their annual income is from 
brazil nuts. For this reason, if they do not repay the debt with brazil nuts from a given harvest, it is 
very difficult for them to repay until the following year. 
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The most serious aspects ofthe transparency issue stem from the following points: 
Transparency on the part of the companies and/or traders 
• The costs charged to the castanero who enters into a working arrangement under 
the shelling service. 
• Dishonesty (robbery) in the weight ofthe nuts 
• The differences in yields obtained in the processing plants compared to those 
obtained in the family (domestic) shelling units 
Transparency on the part of the castaneros 
• The quality of the product 
• The repayment of the loan 
Enough has already been said concerning this last point. Transparency in quality 
refers to the fact that the castaneros are accustomed to negotiating the sale of shelled 
nuts (if a prior agreement has not been established) with the sack closed, without 
allowing the company to check whether or not the product is genuinely of first grade 
quality as stated. In many instances, it is not. 
The most frequent problems of transparency are the fault of traders and companies at 
the expense ofthe castaneros. 
Candela alleges that many of these problems arise from the sharp practices of traders 
(habilatadores, acopiadores and rescatistas), who take every opportunity to cheat 
both the castaneros and the companies. Closer links between the companies and the 
castaneros would, Candela claims, help to improve the level of trust in the industry. 
Another major problem relates to the charges made to the castaneros and the charges 
taken on by the companies. The problem is much more frequent among companies 
that offer a shelling service, a group which includes Candela Peru. (For an account of 
why exporters originally began to offer shelling services, refer to appendix 2) 
Under the shelling service, unshelled nuts entering the processing plant continue to be 
the property of the castaneros, and remain so during all the different phases of 
processing (transport, airing, storage, drying, wetting, shelling, and a second drying) 
until the point when the companies purchase the shelled nuts from the castaneros. 
For this reason, it is logical that all the costs incurred during the preparation and 
processing of the brazil nuts, up to the point of sale, should be charged to the 
castaneros (as the nuts are still his property). 
Problems arise when a castanero are charged for services that he does not consider 
legitimate. For instance, if a castaneros owns a boat and he pilots it himself, he rarely 
considers the costs of depreciation, let alone the fact that he should incorporate a 
payment for himself for his work as a haulier. For him, it is a "saving" and he does 
not see why he should pay the company for transport services. 
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A second problem is that of determining which costs should be charged to the 
castaneros and which should not. Candela9 and La Selva, who until 1998 were the 
only two companies offering a shelling service, had somewhat different methods of 
processing and therefore had different cost structures. For example, on receiving the 
product, La Selva immediately puts the nuts into the drying stage, thus eliminating 
almost entirely the airing phase. By contrast, Candela dedicates more time to airing 
the product, and this in turn reduces the time required in the drying ovens. Its costs 
are thus higher in the first phase 10, but reduced in the second. 
The companies Rovalex and Intemacional de Comercio also now offer the shelling 
service, and have increased the diversity of methods used. Neither have drying ovens, 
but carry out the drying process in the sun using large platforms. Drying takes some 7 
days (without rain) for a process which lasts only 20 hours using ovens, but their 
consumption of electricity is zero. 
Every method carries distinct labour and capital costs, and results in a variation in the 
charges made to the castaneros. The costs borne by the companies also vary. 
The question is, with what logic are some costs charged to the castaneros, and others 
not? There is no clear answer to this. Competition between shelling service providers 
appears not to have reached the level where practices and charges are common across 
companies. Unfortunately, this lack of clarity does nothing to improve the fragile 
relations between the parties involved. 
Castaneros will always wish costs to be reduced, but they are also capable of 
recognising that some costs have to be paid, as long as there is just cause, and as long 
as the company tries to keep them to a minimum through efficient practices. 
There is a third problem relating to company transparency. Companies often fail to 
give accurate and complete information to the castaneros concerning how much it 
will cost him to use the company shelling service. There have been many complaints, 
principally against the company La Selva, because while initially stating that they 
would not charge, for example, for transport from the port to the processing plant, 
they later added this charge. 
A worse criticism is that castaneros are not provided with a detailed breakdown of 
costs at the time of receiving the final payment of the total sum owed (after 
discounting any outstanding advances, and these unexplained costs). 
In the case of Candela, when the company makes the final payment, it provides a 
detailed written breakdown of costs charged to the castaneros. In this aspect, it 
appears that there has been a significant attempt at improving transparency. 
9 Candela states that there are three reasons why it started offering its shelling service. First, it allows 
castaneros, who previously could not shell their own nuts, to benefit from selling shelled nuts. Second, 
it frees the time of castaneros to spend on other activities. Third, it helps to ensure a higher quality 
product in terms of food safety. 
10 However, Candela does not charge warehouse handling fees, thus partially offsetting the cost to the 
castaneros of the first phase of drying. 
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The principal and perhaps only objection that the castaneros had to Candela with 
respect to this point concerned the fact that they considered some costs to be 
excessive, and there were additional, new costs. For example, the cost of food for the 
hauliers was excessive, and the cost of loading and unloading did not previously exist 
because labourers were responsible for this task. In this respect, there is no evidence 
that Candela Peru 11 is making the significant efforts to be cost efficient in order to 
provide greater benefits to the castaneros. 
Castaneros often complain about "robbery of weight". For a long time the 
companies, particularly the traders, have used weighing scales that have been 
tampered with, so that the brazil nuts purchased from the castaneros are 
underweighed. This was the most basic and crude form of the "lack of transparency" 
in their dealings. 
In the case of Candela Peru, this problem does not occur because the company has 
electronic weighing equipment. This is a fact which is not sufficiently known, and is 
an important element within Candela's efforts to improve the transparency of its 
relations with the castaneros. 
Castaneros are almost unanimous in their belief that one sack of unshelled brazil nuts 
yields 20kg of first grade shelled nuts. However, using Candela's processing method, 
supposedly with better equipment and employees experienced in shelling12, in 1998 
they obtained an average of only 16.50 kg of first grade nuts per sack. This represents 
17.5% less than the castaneros would supposedly have obtained if they had shelled 
the nuts themselves. In financial terms, this is equivalent to 14 Peruvian Soles less net 
income per sack (28% less in percentage terms of the total net income expected). 
This has been the reason for much ill feeling among castaneros. 
Since 1999 the average yield has been considerably higher (almost 20kg per sack). 
However, at the same time, Candela have added a wastage factor to allow for drying 
(against the fresh weight of the nuts) which is equivalent to approximately 22%. The 
exact weight loss is communicated to the castaneros via printed sheets. Candela 
characterises the controversy as a problem that has been caused by transparency 
rather than by a lack of it. 
The problem of yield continues to be a point of conflict between castaneros and 
companies. This is not perceived by the castaneros as a problem of transparency 
(though, when seen in perspective, it is) but as a problem of efficiency. In 
consequence, many castaneros are following the proposals of the Candela 
administration to the letter, and are personally supervising the shelling of their own 
produce. 
In summary, there are problems of transparency between the companies and 
castaneros. This is a reflection of the fragile relationships that exist between players. 
Candela is undoubtedly more transparent than any of its competitors, yet when it 
comes to castaneros' perceptions, it is probably tarred with the same brush. 
11 Candela Peru has as a priority objective the achievement of the greatest benefit possible for the 
castanero and, for this reason, should increase efficiency. 
12 And also keen to obtain first grade produce, as this provides them with increased income. 
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2.4.5 Capacity building 
While the concept of ethical trade contains an important quantitative component 
(prices, conditions of credit, funds for investment, etc.), it also contains the equally 
important qualitative element of developing the target population's skills and 
knowledge, thus allowing people to improve their own welfare. Such empowerment 
centres on capacity building in such skills as negotiation and business management. 
This is an area that marks out Candela from the private companies. To support this 
aspect of its activities, until March 1999 the company had external funding from the 
IAF (Inter-American Foundation) and had previously received funds from the 
MacArthur Foundation. 
Candela has used these funds to provide training either directly or through alliances 
with other development organisations working in the region. For Candela, this 
signified a difficult process in which it had to rebuild its relations with the castaneros' 
association ASECAM (Asociaci6n de Extractores de Castafia de Madre de Dios -
Association of Brazil Nut Extractors of Madre de Dios). Candela's commercial 
competitors accused Candela ofbenefitting from unfair competition because, by being 
a civil organisation without a profit motive, it was excused from local and national 
taxes which affected the remaining export companies. In reality, the only tax that 
Candela avoids is company tax, because it does not have to distribute its profits 
among shareholders. 
In relation to Candela Peru's commitment to empowerment, it signed an Institutional 
Strengthening Agreement with ASECAM, through which it is committed to 
participate in all training conducted by the association, either directly or through other 
institutions. 
In association with the NGO Conservation International, Candela has provided 
training in the following: 
• Organisation and Leadership 
• Evaluation of the Statutes of the Association 
In terms of technical training, Candela has participated in the following: 
• 
• 
Forestry Surveys (Inventories) and the Optimum Design of Roads (Pathways) 
conducted through a strategic alliance with Conservation International. 
Management of a Processing Plant 
Candela has provided marketing training in the following topics: 
• 
• 
• 
The Function of Credit in the Industry 
Accounting and the Calculation ofBasic Costs 
Export Procedures 
In addition, marketing and financial evaluation (using a system created by Candela) 
has been given to CREDISMAD. A credit manual has also been edited for 
castaneros. 
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Candela has co-operated with the NGO "TREES" in conducting these training 
courses, and analysing and evaluating the results. 
2.4.6 Investment Funds for Local Communities 
Candela has developed a series of projects designed to generate income in local 
communities: 
• Processing of Native Fruits into Jams and Preserves in the communities of La 
Joya, Alto Loero and Alta Pastora 
• A Rotary Fund for the Raising of Pigs with Grupos Solidarios in the community 
of La Joya 
• Demonstration plots of yucca and maize to introduce agro-ecological practices in 
the community of La Joya 
• Shed for the storage and shelling of brazil nuts with the community of Lago 
Valencia 
• Working capital and the loan of facilities and equipment to women in the 
community of La Joya for the purchase- processing- sale ofbrazil nuts 
However, many of these projects did not achieve the expected results. In some cases 
this was due to the inexperience of the project team, while in others it was the result 
of human resource constraints among the target beneficiaries. 
2.4.7 Candela's Role as Industry Lookout 
Through its knowledge of the international market, derived in part from contact with 
ATOs and NGOs in the North, Candela has been able to foresee international threats 
to the Peruvian brazil nut industry. For instance, Candela and Conservation 
International (Cl) alerted the industry to the threat posed by poor hygiene and drying 
during the handling and processing of the nuts before export. From the 1st January 
1999, the European Community unified hygiene standards required for imported food 
products. This led to an overall tightening of standards. The most exacting standard 
for brazil nuts became the level of mycotoxin contamination, a problem that arises 
through poor drying practices. Reactions within the Peruvian brazil nut industry were 
generally unconstructive. Some industry participants failed to react, others reacted 
defensively, while several exporters began to turn their attentions to the US markets. 
The effects of these changes have yet to be fully felt. However, the situation has 
already proved that the Candela's warning voice was fully justified. 
Candela and Cl are working independently of each other to mobilise all the relevant 
industry and government players to agree a common course of action on the 
mycotoxin problem. The process is slow and difficult because relationships are very 
fragile; there is considerable mutual distrust as well as internal jealousies that need to 
be overcome. Nevertheless, there are indications that the process is underway. 
Candela Peru obtained financial support from the MSP agreement between ADEX 
(Asociaci6n de Exportadores del Peril -the Peruvian Exporters Association) and 
USAID (US Agency for International development) to hold a forum to discuss this 
matter in the second half of August 1999. Cl is working with Prompex (Peru's state-
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run export promotion organisation) towards implementing export standards and 
providing the necessary infrastructure to ensure that standards are met. 
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2.5 Profitability within the Industry 
This section examines the profits that different actors in the brazil nut trading chain 
generate. A more detailed summary of costs and profits appears in Appendix 4. 
2.5.1 Castaneros 
There are four possible ways in which a castanero can operate: 
• Case 1: When the castanero sells unshelled nuts that are not "committed" (as 
repayment of loans) 
• Case 2: When the castanero "sells" unshelled nuts that are "committed". 
• Case 3: When the castanero sells shelled nuts that are not "committed" 
• Case 4: When the castanero "sells" shelled nuts that are "committed" 
Table 5 indicates the relative profitability for the castaneros according to each of 
these situations. Note that the final row expresses profit as a percentage of total costs. 
The figures could equally have been expressed as percentages of the selling price, in 
which case they would have been lower. The absolute level of these percentages is 
less important than their ability to clarify comparisons between cases and between 
different types of market chain participants. 
- - --
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1st Casei 2na Casei 3ra Case2 
Total Costs (TC) (in Soles) 46.6 46.6 3.3 
Selling Price (in Soles) 52.5 46.2 5.4 
Profit Margin (PM) (in Soles) 5.9 -0.4 2.1 
PM (in % of TC) 12.7% -0.8% 62.2% 
1 These figures are calculated for one unit ofunshelled produce= 70kg sack 
2 These figures are calculated for one unit of shelled produce = Kilo of 1st grade nuts 
Source: Field work 
41h Case2 
3.3 
4.8 
1.4 
42.6% 
Clearly, profit margins are significantly higher when the product is transformed from 
unshelled to shelled nuts. In reality the most frequent situations are cases 2 and 4. 
There are few castaneros who have sufficient savings to provide them with adequate 
working capital to start the season without having to borrow. 
Two factors tend to alleviate this situation: 
1 Castaneros almost never commit their entire production, particularly if 
conditions are particularly disadvantageous. They generally only request what 
is necessary to enable them to enter the concession and to begin collecting 
nuts. Money for the remainding operating expenses is obtained from the sale 
of the early production as it is extracted. 
2 As mentioned previously, many of the expenses shown are "shadow" costs; in 
other words, the expenditure is not actually made because the tasks are 
conducted by the castaneros or members of their direct families (i.e. unpaid 
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family labour). In reality therefore, total expenditure is less than that 
estimated in the Table 5. 
2.5.2 Habilitadores 
From a functional standpoint, there is little substantial difference between 
habilitadores and traders. The only real difference lies in the credit and purchase 
terms that the two groups offer to the castaneros. For the purpose of the analysis, we 
defme the habilitador as an individual who provides a cash advance to castaneros in 
exchange for the promise of their future production. The brazil nut price is fixed at 
the moment of handing over the working capital. By contrast, traders purchase brazil 
nuts (shelled and unshelled) without a commitment against an advance. For this 
reason, the sale price is the same as the market price at the time of making the 
transaction. 
Traditionally, the price pre-fixed by the habilitador has been lower than the price set 
by the trader. A recent study13 estimated that the difference was 12% less for product 
committed to the habilitador. 
Table 6 gives a summary of the costs, selling prices and profit margins for the 
habilitador for three cases. 
1st Case: The habi/itador buys unshelled and sells unshelled 
2nd case: The habilitador buys unshelled and sells shelled 
3rd Case: The habilitador buys shelled and sells shelled 
Table 6. Analysis of profitability for the habilitador in each possible contextual 
relationship (1 999) 
1st Case1 2na Case2 
Total Cost (TC) in Soles 46.2 S/. 3.4 S/. 
Selling Price in Soles 52.5 S/. 5.4 S/. 
Profit Margin in Soles 6.3 S/. · 2.0 S/. 
Profit Mar2in (in % of TC) 13.6% 58.8% 
1 The figures are calculated per unit of unshelled product = sack of 70 kg. 
2 The figures are calculated per unit of shelled product = Kilo of 1st grade nuts 
Source: Field Work 
3ra Case2 
4.8 S/. 
5.4 S/. 
0.7 S/. 
13.7% 
In this case it can be seen that levels of profit are positive in all cases, although 
slightly lower than those obtained, in specific cases, by the castaneros. 
2.5.3 Traders 
In the case of the trader, as noted earlier, the prices at which he buys and sells are 
market prices. For this reason, we analyse only one case: that in which the trader 
conducts processing of the nuts in his "low technology" unit. In the other cases 
previously considered, there would in theory be no profit margin14. 
13 AGREDA, Victor. Investigaci6n Socioecon6rnica de la Actividad Castaiiera en Madre de Dios. 
Candela Peru y Proyecto Conservando Castaiiales, June 1999 
14 When he buys the product shelled and sells it shelled and when he buys unshelled and sells 
unshelled. In each case, the purchase and selling prices would be the same. 
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Case* 
Total Cost (TC) in Soles 3.7 SI. 
Selling price in Soles 5.4 SI. 
Profit Margin in Soles 1.7 SI. 
Profit Margin (in % of TC) 45.4% 
* This refers to the trader who buys unshelled nuts at the market price, processes them, and 
then sells them shelled, again at the market price. The figures are calculated per unit of 
unshelled product = sack of70 kg. 
Source: Field Work 
As Table 7 illustrates, the profit margin ofthe trader is less than that of the habilitador 
for a similar situation. However, the trader has the advantage that his profit is 
relatively secure (providing market prices don't decline during processing), while the 
habilitador runs the risk that the indebted castaneros do not repay their debts. 
Furthermore the habilitador has his capital tied up by a third party, without being able 
to move it, without charging any rate of interest, and for a period of time which is 
never less than two months. 
2.5.4 Processing and Export Companies 
It is important here to make the qualitative distinction between a processing company 
and an export company. 
A processing company is one that has the buildings and equipment required to process 
(dry and shell) brazil nuts in a centralised and efficient manner. 
A company that merely exports does not have these facilities, and generally has 
access to relatively small buildings which are sufficient only to store shelled nuts 
temporarily between purchase and transport to the place of export. These companies 
also employ considerably fewer labourers. 
The analysis below was conducted for the following situations: 
• Case 1: When a processing company buys unshelled produce 
• Case 2: When a processing company buys shelled produce 
• Case 3: When an export company buys shelled produce 
In three cases, we have assumed that the company pays the market price. Almost all 
companies function simultaneously as lenders (habilitadores) and buyers. 
~ J . . , 
Casei Case2 Case3 
Total costs (TC) 8.55 SI. 10.17SI. 8.71 SI. 
Selling price 10.18 SI. 10.18 SI. 10.18 SI. 
Profit margin 1.63 SI. 0.01 SI. 1.47 SI. 
Profit margin (as % of TC) 19.13% - 0.10% 16.88% 
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Table 9 presents information on the profitability of companies that function as 
habilitadores. 
------- . - - · · -- ·,.,- -- - . r - - ., - -- ·r - -- - -. ·o --- - ------ - ' - - - - " 
Case 1 Case2 Case3 
Total costs (TC) 8.23 S/. 9.52 SI. 8.06 S/. 
Selling price 10.18 SI. 10.18 S/. 10.18 S/. 
Profit margin 1.95 S/. 0.66 S/. 2.12 S/. 
Profit margin (as% ofTC) 23.69% 6.93% 26.30% 1 
In reality, a company normally uses both forms of operating. Part of their capital is 
invested in obtaining future produce, and this provides them with a relatively greater 
profit margin. Their remaining capital is retained in order to diversify their portfolio 
of clients, and reduce their level of risk. 
2.5.5 Conclusions on profitability within the industry 
Conclusions from two types of comparison are worth drawing: 
1. Comparisons within trading chain groups. Profits depend greatly on the 
circumstances of the individual or company. The greatest determinant is access 
to capital, either to invest as working capital (a major profitability constraint for 
castaneros), or as fixed investment in shelling facilities (a major profitability 
constraint for habilitadores). 
2. Comparisons across groups, summarised in Table 10. 
' "".r 
- --.., 
Type of market participant Range of profit 
(as % oftotal costs) 
Castaneros -0.8 -42.6* 
Habilitadores 13.6-58.8 
Traders 45.3 
Exporters 0.1-19.1 
Processors/ exporters 0.1-26.3 
* The most likely range of profitability 
Traders and habilitadores potentially make the largest per unit profits. However, of 
all the groups, these two face the greatest exposure to risk. Traders experience the 
risk that prices will move against them in between buying and selling brazil nuts. 
Habilitadores not only face this risk but also are liable to suffer from default on loans 
made to castaneros. So, while profits can be high, variability of profit is also high, 
giving rise to a greater likelihood ofbankruptcy. 
Exporters and processor/exporters are potentially open to similar risks, but the 
vertically integrated and diversified nature of their businesses means that the chance 
of business failure is much lower. In effect, these companies have spread their risk 
over a range of (sometimes unrelated) commercial activities. 
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2.5.6 Candela's profitability 
Table 11 indicates the structure of costs and incomes from Candela's different lines of 
business. 
Table 11. Structure Of Costs And Profits Forecast For 1999 According To Line Of 
Business 
Brazil Nuts Oil* Candles* Local Pecans 
(SI per (SI per (SI per unit) Market (SI (SI annual 
unit)* unit) annual sales) sales) 
Selling price 11.92 11.29 4316.00 94393.38 207.38 
Costs 9.86 6.34 3432.88 88802.90 189.68 
Profit 2.06 4.95 0.88 5590.51 17.70 
In% 35.4% 78.3% 20.5% 6.3% 9.3% 
* In these cases, information is given in selling prices, unit costs and margins of utility; while in the 
case of the local market and pecans, the analysis considers the annual operational results of the 
respective lines (in Peruvian Soles). 
Sources: 
AGREDA, Victor. Investigaci6n Socioecon6mica de la Actividad Castaiiera en Madre de Dios. 
Candela Peru y Proyecto Conservando Castafiales, June 1999 
Internal Documents from Candela Peru 
ITDG. Manual de Procesamiento de Aceite (Manual for Oil Processing). ITDG, 1999. 
Candela appears to make a considerable profit from its brazil nut activities. In fact, on 
the basis of these figures, the organisation makes considerably more money per brazil 
nut than all the comparable business models contained in tables 8 and 9. However, 
two factors may have caused bias in the figures. Firstly, in the absence of cost data 
from Candela's competitors, the cost figures in tables 8 and 9 were adapted from data 
supplied by Candela. Consequently any cost efficiencies that Candela's competitors 
have realised above those achieved by Candela were not reflected in the figures. If 
such efficiencies exist, then the competition's profit margins would be higher than 
those shown. 
The second potential cause of bias concerns Candela itself. Because the organisation 
exists to promote the welfare of the local brazil nut community and is therefore not 
merely a commercial concern, it employs more staff than its competitors. For 
instance, Candela employs a greater number of managerial, research and technical 
staff. The figures in Table 11 do not reflect these additional costs and consequently 
Candela's profit may be overstated. Unfortunately, the extent to which donor grants 
offset staff overheads is not known. 
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Part 3. Key Findings and Conclusions 
The following key findings emerged from the research 
• The brazil nut trade is a small element of the international edible nut trade with 
approximately 1.6% of total market share by volume. 
• Brazil nut supply is inelastic in the short term. fu contrast, demand is elastic 
because the edible nut products are easily substitutable with one another. 
• futernational brazil nut prices are determined by basic supply and demand 
patterns, without the influence of commodity exchanges and futures markets. 
Prices are also cyclical because low international prices cause collectors to 
abandoning their brazil nut activities, thereby precipitating a supply shortage. 
• The international edible nut trade considers Peru as a brazil nut origin of last 
resort due to inconsistency of supply and poor quality. 
• From FOB to consumption the trade pattern does not currently have an ethical 
dimension. Furthermore the high degrees of efficiency and competitivenes within 
the international trade mean that there is very limited scope for introducing ethical 
innovations. 
• Conditions within Peru's internal brazil nut export marketing chain are highly 
competitive. There is, in fact, too much competition, with too many traders of all 
types chasing too little product. This has led to fragmentation of the industry, 
absence of trust between participants, lack of investment funds for modernisation, 
a short term view of the future, and a high turnover of companies. Overall, there 
is an inability to exploit economies of scale, a situation that creates poor cost 
competitiveness, and poor quality of product and service. 
• These factors should be acknowledged when appraising the performance of 
Candela Peru. 
• On the evidence that we have gathered, Candela does not pay castaneros prices 
that are higher than those offered by its competitors. Undoubtedly, part of the 
cause of this is the small size of the alternative trade brazil nut market compared 
with Candela's overall scale of operations. Two further factors might exacerbate 
the problem. Firstly, the nature of its development work causes the organisation 
to be top-heavy with management, and technical and research staff, giving rise to 
high overhead costs. Secondly, Candela's use of electronic weighing scales 
means that castaneros are not cheated through under-declaration of weight, and 
therefore in reality may receive competitive (or perhaps more than competitive) 
prices. There is currently no proof to validate either of these explanations. 
• Of all sources of credit in the region, Candela offers the most favourable terms, a 
practice that brings significant improvements to the lives of castaneros. The 
organisation has been a true innovater in this context and its competitors are being 
forced to adopt similar practices. 
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• Candela and Conservation International were the only organisations that foresaw 
the problems that would arise from the tightening of importing country regulations 
on mycotoxin contamination of edible nuts. Subsequently, Candela has been 
participating in efforts to improve standards within the local industry. 
• Candela has made considerable efforts to improve transparency of its shelling 
service through adopting itemised cost sheets, using electronic scales, and 
allowing castaneros to supervise the shelling process. However, high levels of 
distrust between castaneros and traders in general, mean that discontent lingers. 
• Candela has attempted to build the capacities of individual castaneros and their 
representative organisations. Success has been mixed. 
Conclusions 
International ethical trading initiatives should avoid commodities that have a 
multiplicity of substitutes, and no-end product that is easily identifiable by consumers 
as "ethical". Fair-traded coffee, tea and, to a lesser extent, cocoa/chocolate provide 
successful illustrations in this context. 
However, there is still scope for trading organisations in developing countries to act 
ethically towards their suppliers, regardless of what commodity is traded. In 
Candela's case, the trading environment in which it operates is difficult. Its 
experience highlights the problems of delivering financial improvements to a target 
population while operating in a competitive (or in this case, an over-competitive) 
marketing chain. However, Candela's presence has encouraged its competitors to 
improve their business practices to the advantage of castaneros. 
Candela's ethical performance has been mixed. The organisation has yet to offer 
castaneros significantly higher prices than its competitors, yet in other aspects, such 
as credit and transparency, it has introduced innovations that bring substantial benefit 
to castaneros. Despite this, it has yet to gain a perception among castaneros that it is 
significantly different from conventional trading and processing companies. 
According to its own figures, Candela has only a 5% share of the Peruvian brazil nut 
export market. At this low volume, Candela is unable to exploit economies scale and 
pass greater benefits to the castaneros. 
Candela's ability to see threats and long term developments puts it in a unique 
position among local organisations in Madre de Dios. However, the experience with 
changes to import regulations on mycotoxins shows that its voice goes largely 
unheard in an atmosphere of short term perspectives and mistrust. The role of 
protecting the interests of the industry would be better performed by an industry 
association that contains representatives from all groups involved in the trade. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Companies that buy brazil nuts in Madre de Dios (June 
1999) 
• Exportaciones de la Selva 
• Compailla Inmobiliaria Peru e Inversiones (IMPERUSA) 
• Intemacional de Comercio 
• Bonilla Export 
• Rovalex 
• El Basque E.l.R.L. 
• Fast Trade 
• Deshidratados 
• Comercializadora Manu S.A (COMASA) 
• Premium Trading 
• Candela Peru 
• E & F Traders S.A. 
• Others 
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Appendix 2. The advent of shelling service 
Traditionally, the export companies operating in Madre de Dios bought brazil nuts 
either shelled or unshelled. The buying decision was entirely influenced by whether 
or not the company had the facilities and machinery required to carry out the 
processing and shelling of the nuts. 
The profit of a company was much higher from selling shelled nuts. For this reason, 
in order to establish themselves in the market place, all the companies had as a 
priority the acquisition of the infrastructure required to carry out processing. The 
castaneros also became progressively more aware of the advantages of shelling the 
nuts before sale, as this allowed them to retain a greater margin of the benefits. 
In earlier years, the companies in Madre de Dios (the largest of which being 
Exportadora El Sol) were few in number, and only purchased unshelled nuts. Trading 
in shelled nuts only became commonplace once this huge company disappeared, an 
event which prompted a boom in the appearance of small companies and generated a 
higher level of competition15. With time, the practice of selling shelled nuts has been 
progressively adopted by the castaneros, and has been to their own benefit. 
The following table demonstrates the substantial difference that exists between these 
two forms of selling (shelled vs. unshelled). 
COMPARISON BETWEEN BOTH 
FORMS OF SELLING 
Shelled Nuts Unshelled nuts 
Total production costs 30 soles 30 soles 
Costs of shelling 20 soles 0 soles 
Total costs 50 soles 30 soles 
Selling price (per Kilo) 5 soles 0.71 soles* 
Number of Kilos 20 kilos 70 kilos 
Total income 100 soles 50 soles 
Profit 50 soles 20 soles 
Percentage profit 100% 67% 
* Unshelled brazil nuts are not sold by kilo, but by sack. Each sack weighs approximately 70kg and 
yields some 20kg of shelled product. 
Source and interpretation: the author 
The table indicates that, in a market that is functioning normally, a castanero can 
expect 150% greater net income from selling shelled nuts rather than unshelled nuts. 
It is clear that selling the brazil nuts shelled benefits the castanero considerably more 
than selling nuts unshelled. 
In the battle to win market share, the company La Selva became the largest (since the 
disappearance of El Sol) and acquired its own facilities and equipment for processing. 
15 It is certain that this lack of control on the part of some new traders, who see brazil nuts as "manna 
from heaven" is upsetting the market to such an extent that many experienced traders, who traditionally 
only purchased unshelled nuts to process themselves, are now opting to buy the nuts shelled. They 
indicate that "you earn less, but the profit is secure". 
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Originally, to have your own equipment was a qualitative advantage, but as a result of 
increasing competition (and tendency for castaneros to sell shelled nuts), it became a 
disadvantage. It did not make sense for the company to buy nuts already shelled (as it 
did for the other companies, who had only small premises and no machinery for 
processing) because this signified under-utilisation of their fixed costs. On account of 
this, the company began to loose its presence in the marketplace. 
It subsequently developed a simple but highly intelligent commercial response: it 
developed and offered the system known as the Shelling Service. This service 
consisted of receiving the product as unshelled nuts, processing them using the 
company facilities and then, once shelled, buying them from the castanero as shelled 
nuts. 
This innovation offered the castaneros the advantages of being able to sell the product 
shelled, and therefore to gain higher profits, while at the same time it offered the 
possibility, not seen previously, of being able to complete the transaction in record 
time. When castaneros began to shell the nuts in their own homes, they used family 
labour (their wife and younger children), but few possessed shelling machines (some 
were forced to shell using sticks and stones). In some cases, castaneros contracted 
women (generally not more than 3-4 in number) for the task, particularly those who 
had shelling machines. 
Under this system, to shell100 sacks (an acceptable yield from a concession) took on 
average between 4-5 months. Because castaneros tended to sell the nuts little by 
little, they also received and spent their income little by little and, consequently, by 
the end of the season, they were not able to see and appreciate the fruits of their work. 
With the new shelling service, the 100 sacks could be shelled in a week and in this 
way the castanero received all the money at once. This had its advantages; the 
castanero could effectively complete the transaction promptly, and receive a large 
sum of money which he could invest in some other activity. 
While many castaneros took advantage of this, it was not the case for everyone, and 
many others spent their money unproductively. However, this not the responsibility 
ofthe company, but the result ofthe idiosynchracies of individuals. 
The motivation behind this innovation was the simple search for private gain. 
Nevertheless, the positive effect of competition as a generator of innovative ideas 
needs to be highlighted, as well as the ability of these to raise the well-being of 
society. 
The following year (1998), Candela Peru saw the enormous possibilities offered by 
this method of working with the castaneros, although it approached the innovation 
from a rather different perspective. 
Candela's interest in increasing their level of participation in the Peruvian brazil nut 
market was evidently one of their motivations. Helping the castaneros to capture 
more value-added was seen as an effective means to benefit the target population. 
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One of the principal causes of poor quality is related to lack of hygiene during 
processing when this is conducted at the level of decentralised, domestic units (i.e. in 
the forest or in the individual houses of the castaneros). 
It is for this reason that the shelling service is in reality the best option in terms of 
balancing the importance of obtaining a fair income (more so than a fair price per 
unit) for the individual castanero, with the importance of protecting the quality of the 
product and, therefore, the market itself (and this activity which generates 
employment and income for castaneros in general). 
The importance of the shelling service is such that other companies (including 
Rovalex and Intemacional de Comercio) which have facilities for processing nuts, 
have also begun to offer the service since the beginning of this year. 
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Appendix 3. Historical Trends in Prices 
1) Evolution of the Internal Price 1990 -1998 
Within the period under consideration, price has tended to increase steadily. The only 
exception was a fall (in the order of52.5%) which occurred in 199316 . 
On average, during these seven years, a Kilo of first grade shelled nuts in Puerto 
Maldonado increased from S/.0.50 to S/.4.81, representing a percentage increase of 
862% and an annual rate of increase of 123.14%. 
Much of this increase is associated with the devaluation of the national currency. 
Changes in (the international) price in foreign currencies have been somewhat 
different: the variation between 1994 and the present was considerably less (34 % 
increase, with an annual rate of increase of8 .5 %). 
Preliminary estimates of the average 1998 price for first grade brazil nuts is S/. 5.41 
per Kilo, which is consistent with the upward trend in price (representing an increase 
of12.39 %). 
We should not expect this trend to continue indefinitely. In contrast, it can be 
assumed that it has reached a ceiling at approximately 5 soles, as indicated by a halt in 
the annual rate of increase with respect to the average. 
1990 
S/. per Kg 1st 0.50 
% var. inS/. 
US$ per Kg. 2.42 
1st 
% var. in US$ 
CHANGES IN THE PRICE OF 
BRAZIL NUTS IN MADRE DE DIOS 
(in soles per kilo for 1st grade shelled nuts) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
0.70 0.80 0.38 3.00 3.20 
+40 + 14 -53 +689 +7 
0.90 0.64 0.19 1.38 1.42 
-63 -29 -70 + 619 +3 
Source: INEI - MDD 
1996 
3.89 
+22 
1.63 
+ 14 
* Preliminary data based on internal information from Candela Peru 
2) Volume of Brazil Nuts Commercialised in Madre de Dios 
1997 1998* 
4.81 5.41 
+24 + 12 
1.82 1.85 
+ 12 + 1 
With reference to the total volume of brazil nuts sold (in net kilos), though the nuts 
are a natural product whose production depends exclusively on natural factors, it 
exploitation and, therefore, the volume commercialised, is more affected by market 
considerations. 
Statistical data verifies a certain correlation between the volume commercialised and 
the unit price (in soles or dollars). This is true both in data derived from internal 
production statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture as well as in data from 
16 The statistical data on international prices did not register any "trough" in the international price 
during this same period. 
36 
ADUANAS on the volumes exported. The only exception was 1993, when the 
volume of production increased despite a dramatic fall in the market price. 
The following table shows changes in the volume of shelled brazil nut 
commercialised in Madre de Dios, according to statistics provided by INEI, who use a 
source the Oficina de Forestal y Fauna de la Direcci6n Regional Agraria de Madre 
de Dios (The Forestry and Wildlife Office of the Regional Agricultural Office of 
Madre de Dios). 
CHANGES IN THE VOLUME OF BRAZIL NUTS 
MARKETED IN MADRE DE DIOS 
-.... --- ----- -, 
Year Tonnes %Variation 
1980 1.446,4 
1981 363,4 -74,87% 
1982 1.051,8 189,41% 
1983 1.432,9 36,24% 
1984 1.437,8 0,35% 
1985 861,7 -40,07% 
1986 1.135,8 31,81% 
1987 959,4 -15,53% 
1988 906,5 -5,51% I 
1989 1.445,1 59,41% 
1990 1.371,7 -5,08% 
1991 454,0 -66,90% 
1992 239,2 -47,31% 
1993 995,4 316,15% 
1994 1.013,2 1,78% 
1995 1.128,6 11,39% 
1996 1.203,5 6,63% 
1997 2.069,5 71,96% 
Source: INEI- MDD 
This table demonstrates that the production (exploitation) of brazil nuts has not 
increased significantly in terms of volume, even in 1997 (a year much remembered in 
the region because of the exceptionally good harvest). From this it can be deduced 
that production has not depended exclusively on natural factors, but on the increases 
in price up to its present level. 
In some years pre-1993, statistical records suggest that brazil nut production fell to 
very low levels. Such low production figures are implausible, and most likely reflect 
the fact that many castaneros, when faced with very low prices, simply did not enter 
their concessions to collect the nuts as it was not profitable to do so 17. 
3) Changes by Month in 1998 
17 Such events are well known in Puerto Maldonado, and are remembered with much 
sadness by the castaneros as those years when they had to "leave the brazil nuts to rot in 
the forest while they kicked tins around" because the price did not justify the investment. 
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Information given below refers to the prices paid for brazil nuts by Candela Peru in its 
La Joya plant in 1998 for produce not "promised" in its various forms [in repayment 
ofloans or advances]. 
In this sense, we cannot extrapolate from this, except to give a "useful reference", to 
calculate the average price in the department during 1998.18 
a) Price of Shelled Brazil Nuts 
Shelled nuts were marketed from February. They reached their highest point during 
this month, but then there followed a decline which was only reversed in July, when 
prices began to increase once more (though without again returning to the high 
average values for February). 
Between February and June the price of shelled nuts in the market of Puerto 
Maldonado fell by 16.4% 
CHANGES IN THE PRICE OF SHELLED NUTS 
, --- -
- .- -
"" 
Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Sept. Av. 
SI. per Kg 1st 5.86 5.80 5.58 5.18 4.90 5.03 5.63 5.35 
%Var. -1.02 -3.79 -7.17 -5.41 +2.65 +11.93 
US$ I Kg 1st 2.10 2.07 1.98 1.82 1.69 1.72 1.85 1.89 
%Var. -1.41 -4.13 -7.95 -7.52 +2.23 +7.33 
Source: Candela Peru 
The cause of the rise can be explained by the relative scarcity of the product which 
obliged companies to pay a relatively higher price in order to meet their commitments 
to fill container ships. 
This scarcity is evident, for example, in the month of August, when the company did 
not make a single purchase of shelled nuts, but was confined to processing produce 
which had already entered for the service. 
b) Price ofUnshelled Brazil Nuts 
The characteristics of production last year suggest that few purchases were made of 
unshelled nuts, and these were confined exclusively to the end of February and 
beginning ofMarch. 
18 However, we have already seen that Candela Peru offers a price which is very similar to the average 
price offered by the other companies. 
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CHANGES IN THE PRICE OF UNSHELLED NUTS 
- -~--- r - - -----/ 
43 Week l 3 Week 23 Week 33 Week 43 Week Ave. I 
February March March March March 
S/.per Bca 73.20 73.36 76.46 74.10 77.00 74.051 
%Var. +0.22% +4.23% -3.09% + 3.91% l 
Source: Candela Peni 
The table confirms that 1998 was a good year, in terms of price, with an average close 
to 75 soles. 
In comparison, information taken from direct sources for 1999 show the purchase 
price per a sack of unshelled nuts to be approximately 50-55 soles, 40% less than the 
average price in the previous year. 
c) Price of Brazil Nuts under the Shelling Service 
In general, we should expect a purchase price similar to that of nuts shelled 
(independently) in the family production units. 
In the case of Candela Peni, the price of nuts purchased through the shelling service is 
slightly higher than the price paid for nuts shelled independently. This is illustrated 
by the following table. 
S/. per Kg 1st 
%Variation 
US$/Kg l 5t 
%Variation 
CHANGES IN THE PRICE OF SHELLED NUTS 
UNDER THE SHELLING SERVICE 
(in soles per kilo for first grad~ nuts) 
Mar. Apr. May Jun. July 
5.67 5.11 5.24 4.99 5.57 
-9.88 +2.54 -4.77 +11.62 
2.02 1.81 1.84 1.72 1.91 
-10.2 +1.68 -6.90 +11.16 
Source: Candela Peni 
Aug. Aver. 
5.53 5.43 
-0.72 
1.87 1.86 
-2.03 
Unfortunately, this information does not specify a processing date. Because of this, 
we have supposed (reasonably) that this is conducted continuously. 
This deficiency in the information is probably the main reason why a clear and 
marked trend in the behaviour of the price cannot be seen. Nevertheless, there is a 
clear "trough" between the months of April and June. 
In other words, the price begins high and ends high, but tends to decline over most of 
the duration of commercial activity. 
4) Determinants of the Internal Price 
In general, it has been held that higher volumes provided a better negotiating position 
for the castanero with respect to the price paid for the final sale of shelled nuts. 
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During the current year, information was compiled which supported this assertion, as 
illustrated in the following table. 
SCALE OF PRICES ACCORDING TO VOLUME 
TRANSACTED; JULY 1999 (in soles) 
Less than 500 kg More than 500 kg 
Puerto Capitania 5.30 5.40 
Puerto Tambopata 5.30 5.40 
La Selva 5.40 5.50 
Intemacional de Comercio 5.50 5.60 
Carretera 5.30 5.40 
Candela Peru 5.00 5.40* 
Jaramillo 5.50 5.50 
-- --
* In one special case, which involved approximately 18,000 kg, a price of up to 6.06 
soles per Kilo was offered, which they called the "export price" 
Source: Field work 
Own interpretation 
This demonstrates that in almost all cases (with the exception of Jaramillo), extra is 
being paid for produce supplied in higher volumes. This practice is commonplace. 
When the nuts are not already "promised" (under a loan arrangement, for example), it 
is the castaneros who have the better negotiating position. This is because there are 
many offers for the produce at varying prices (which are not necessarily co-ordinated 
in any way), even within the same physical area such as the ports of Tambopata and 
Capitania. 
5) Comparative Analysis between Internal Production and Exports 
It is important to consider the differences that exist between internal production, as 
"declared" to the Ministry of Agriculture, and the official export figures registered by 
ADUANAS. 
The second of these sources is the more reliable. The first provides information that 
cannot be verified, and furthermore is liable to underestimates on the part of the 
castanero; a fact which is predictable considering that a levy, proportional to the 
volume of brazil nuts extracted, has to be paid for rights to the concession. 
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COMP ARJSON BETWEEN FIGURES FOR INTERNAL 
PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS 
(in ne!}cilos) 
1993 1994 
Exports 1.220.031, 1.372.043, 
23 93 
Internal 995.438,70 1.013.200, 
Production 00 
Difference 224.592,53 358.843,93 
Difference (in 18,41% 26,15% 
% 
of exports) 
* Author's estimate of production 
Source: INEI- MDD I ADUANAS 
1995 
1.586.259, 
64 
1.128.627, 
00 
457.632,64 
28,85% 
1996 1997 
1.876.692, 2.666.888, 
27 67 
1.203.495, 2.069.504, 
00 00 
673.197,27 597.384,67 
35,87% 22,40% 
1998 
1.056.260, 
81 
778.075,40 
* 
278.185,41 
26,34% 
The table demonstrates that "underestimates" in the information declared to the 
Ministry are on average in the order of 26.34 %. This is equivalent to a quarter of the 
official production, and the figure has tended to increase in recent years. 
The figure should in reality be higher if internal consumption is taken into account, 
also the proportion of waste or low quality nuts that make up each batch, and which 
are not suitable for export. 
In the case of Candela, internal consumption constitutes some 10.5% of total brazil 
nut production and a similar proportion is destined for processing to produce oil. 
If these figures are taken into account, ' 'underestimates" in the information declared 
must be in the order of 42% - almost half of actual production. 
Similarly, it is important to make a comparison of the internal and external unit price 
of brazil nuts in order to be able to put together a value-added chain for the industry in 
each phase of the chain. 
6) Peruvian FOB Price- Whole, Shelled Brazil Nuts- 1993/98 
The following information is provided in the table: 
COMPARISON BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRICES 
FOR PERUVIAN BRAZIL NUTS 1993 - 1998 
1993 
Local Price 0.19 
FOB Price 2.12 
Local Pr./FOB Pr. 9.0% 
Local Pr. - FOB Pr. 1.93 
- -----
Source: PROMPEX, INEI-MDD 
Author's interpretation 
1994 
1.38 
2.82 
48.9% 
1.44 
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1995 1996 1997 
1.42 1.63 1.82 
2.80 3.15 3.35 
50.6% 51.7% 54.4% 
1.38 1.52 1.53 
- -
1998 
1.85 
3.17 
58.3% 
1.32 
During the period 93-98, the price of brazil nuts in the city of Puerto Maldonado has 
increased from 0.19 US$ to 1.85 US$. This is equivalent to a rise of 873.68%, while 
the FOB price per kilo of exported nuts has increased by only 49.53%. 
This explains the increase in the ratio between the local price/FOB price. It is also 
illustrative of how this fact (the decreasing difference between both prices) was 
possible - the export of brazil nuts was evidently a highly profitable enterprise. 
In absolute terms19, this difference has actually decreased, as indicated in the above 
table. In 1993 the companies had a gross margin of utility (without discounting 
export costs) of 1.93 US$, while in 1998, this margin had decreased to only 1.32 US$. 
In other words, it fell by 316% which, in absolute terms, is equivalent to 0.61 cents 
(US$) clear profit per kilo of nuts exported. 
Considering that each company moves on average 115 tonnes of brazil nuts annually, 
it can be expected that during this period they have made20 more than 70 thousand US 
Dollars in annual net profit at the expense ofthe castanero. 
7) International Price of Shelled Nuts- 1990/99 
As is widely known, brazil nut trees are found in significant concentrations (clusters) 
only in the Amazon triangle in the Selva Baja of Peru (Madre de Dios), Brazil (Acre, 
Para) and Bolivia (Riberalta). Any statistic which mentions another country as an 
exporter of brazil nuts is referring to re-exportation or redistribution. 
"Significant numbers" or concentrations of trees refer to areas of the Amazon forest 
which are characterised by land which is not prone to flooding, and where there is an 
average density greater that one brazil nut tree per hectare. 
Many years ago, the world thought of brazil nuts as originating from Brazil, hence the 
name. It is now known that the north-western region of Bolivia contains as much or 
more brazil nuts than Brazil. However, for various reasons, Bolivia previously chose 
to sell the nuts to Brazil who would then export them. 
At the present time Bolivia, as well as Peru, is fighting to change the image and the 
name of the nut, which originates from this area, to the amazon nut. Bolivia has a 
brazil nut industry which is better consolidated and with a more business-like 
19 It could be argued that the reason for the increase [ Local Price I FOB Price] is because the whole 
increase in the FOB price has been transferred to the castanero. However, the table demonstrates that 
this is not the case. The increase in absolute (and not relative) terms in the local price has been greater 
than the increase in FOB price. As we understand it, the reason for any improvement in the position of 
the castaneros is exclusively the result of increased competition, prompted by the high profitability of 
the trade, which has created better conditions for them (against the wishes of some companies). The 
fact that this occurred proved that it had always been possible. 
20 Or "would have made" would be more appropriate, as it is profit that they have progressively 
stopped receiving. 
It must not be forgotten that this excludes the profits that are still being made under the current market 
conditions, and which we analyse in a later section. 
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approach21 , and is now putting considerable effort into changing the international 
image ofthe quality of this product. 
The following statistics confirm this asertion: 
IMPORTS OF BRAZIL NUTS INTO GREAT BRITAIN- 1998 
, . __ _ - - ---- - J 
Brazil Bolivia Peni Others Total 
Tonnes 332.296 2.495.329 200.906 103.583 3.134.112 
In% 10.61% 79.67% 6.41% 3.31% 100.00% 
Source: AMBERWOOD TRADING LTD 
According to a recent report from the Bolivian National Brazil Nut Council (Consejo 
Nacional de la Castaiia), these statistics are very similar to total world exports. 
The same source indicates that the total quantity of brazil nuts offered for export 
world-wide is made up as follows: 
Million US$ 
In% 
WORLD EXPORTS OF BRAZIL NUTS 
(according to value) 
Brazil Bolivia Peni 
6,0 million 22,5 million 1,5 million 
20,0% 75,0% 5,0% 
Source: Consejo Nacional de la Castafia (Bolivia) 
Total 
30,0 
100,0% 
There are three ways of marketing the nuts in their natural form22 : whole, broken or 
chipped. 
Without doubt, the best known of these is the former (whole nuts) because of 
important differences in their relative price, as we will discuss later. Within this 
category, the produce is selected according to size and four different sizes are 
recognised commercially: Large, Small, Medium and Midgets. 
At present, the last two of these sizes are the most valued, while the first two 
(particularly the Large category) only have a small market and generally only as a 
complement to the other categories. 
21 This was demonstrated in the stand taken by the union of Bolivian businesses which sent a delegation 
to meet the European food hygiene authorities to request a postponement in the measures imposed 
from the 1st January, to deal with the issue of aflotoxins. 
22 Some Brazilian, Bolivian and Peruvian companies are marketing brazil nuts with a basic salting 
process (with salt and in small cubes or spheres, smaller than a dice). Though this market is so far still 
marginal, in has interesting possibilities. The company Renmero in Brazil and El Bosque in Peru are 
involved (the latter sells bleached and salted nuts to the British company H & T Walker, with whom it 
has a contract which is mutually exclusive). Exploring further this possibility is of considerable 
interest, as it would allow a higher price to be paid for the nuts locally. This is certainly true in the case 
of El Bosque which is well known as one of the companies offering highest prices. It recently offered 
6.20 S/. for a large consignment from ASECAM. 
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I 
a) Whole Brazil Nuts 
As previously stated, the whole nuts marketed are principally in the Midget and 
Medium size categories. 
In the following case, we have taken as a reference the price of Midget nuts, but it 
should be noted that there is little substantial difference between the categories. 
The source used is the internal source of the well known English company 
Amberwood. Considering that the product is a commodity, the information is highly 
useful. 
BEHAVIOUR OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRJCE 
FOR WHOLE BRAZIL NUTS 1992 - 1999 
Price %Variation 
US$ / Pound US$ /kg. SI. I kg. in US$ 
1992 0,68 1,49 1,85 
1993 0,94 2,07 4,10 39,18% 
1994 1,19 2,63 5,72 26,64% 
1995 1,28 2,81 6~32 6,97% 
1996 1,49 3,27 7,81 16,39% 
1997 1,55 3,41 9,03 4,21% 
1998-I 1,46 3,20 8,90 -6,02% 
1998-II 1,28 2,82 8,04 -11,89% 
1998-III 1,23 2,71 8,06 -3,80% 
1998-IV 1,09 2,41 7,38 -11,35% 
Jan-99 1,28 2,82 9~07 17,07% 
Feb-99 1,34 2,95 9,99 4,69% 
Mar-99 1,38 3,04 10,26 2,99% 
Apr-99 1,39 __ 3,05 10,21 0,36% 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Sources: Peru en Nlimeros 1999 I BCRP I AMBER WOOD TRADING LTD 
Author's interpretation 
During the period 1992-97, an upward tendency can be observed in the international 
price of the nuts until a peak is reached in 1997 of 1.55 US$ per Pound. This is 
equivalent to approximately 3.5 US$ per kilo of nuts for export. During these five 
years, the price in US$ has increased by 128%, giving an annual rate of increase of 
approximately 25.6%. 
The following year (1998) the price fell substantially by 30% of its value, but rose 
again during the current year (based on information registered up to the month of 
April) by some 27.5%. This tendency to rise has continued during recent months, 
with the current price calculated at 1.48 US$ per Pound for last month (July). 
The national exchange rates have also experienced a continuous increase during the 
period 1992- 1999. When this has occurred, an increase in the price in soles has been 
given at higher rates and, vice versa, cushioned the fall in the international price 
during 1998. 
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Compared with the internal price of the brazil nut in 1998, there was no "trough" in 
the international price equivalent to that observed locally. 
This phenomenon can be explained by the protectionist attitude of the companies 
when faced with a fall in the international price. By the end of the year, the recovery 
in the local price was prompted by their need to fill container ships already contracted, 
and the problems of scarcity (low production) which characterised 1998. 
(b) Broken Brazil Nuts 
The behaviour of split (or broken) nuts has followed almost exactly the same 
tendencies as those of whole nuts, though the considerable increase in price recorded 
in 1994 was much more marked here than in the case ofwhole nuts. 
Another factor that needs to be highlighted is that the future of broken nuts is less 
clear than in the case of whole nuts. While the latter have increased in price in 1999 
from the low levels reached in the previous year, the price of the broken product on 
the last registered date (April 1999) was exactly the same as that recorded during the 
first quarter of 1998. 
BEHAVIOUR OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRICE 
FOR BROKEN BRAZIL NUTS 1992 - 1999 
Price %Variation 
US$ /Pound US$ /kg. S/. /kg. in US$ 
1993 0,27 0,58 1,15 
1994 0,66 1,46 3,17 149,64% 
1995 0,79 1,74 3,91 19,42% 
1996 0,84 1,84 4,39 5,70% 
1997 0,98 2,15 5,68 16,77% 
1998-I 0,77 1,69 4,71 -21 ,03% 
1998-II 0,65 1,42 4,04 -16,23% 
1998-III 0,73 1,61 4,77 13,18% 
1998-IV 0,58 1,27 3,90 -20,89% 
Jan-99 0,80 1,76 5,67 38,53% 
Feb-99 0,92 2,02 6,86 15,00% 
Mar-99 0,77 1,69 5,73 -16,30% 
____Apf:99 0,77 1,69 5,67 0,00% 
Sources: Peru en Nillneros 1999 I BCRP I AMBERWOOD TRADING LTD. 
Author's interpretation. 
The low relative price of broken nuts (only 55.57% of the price of whole nuts) 
explains why this form of marketing is less widespread. hnporters take advantage of 
the status of the broken nuts as a by-product by offering a substantially lower price. 
Because of this, Candela's strategy of transforming the broken (and chipped) nuts into 
new products (such as brazil nut oil, which will be discussed .in a later section) is 
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attractive in terms of its internal financial sustainability, particularly considering the 
profit margins of this activity. 
c) Chipped Brazil Nuts 
In the case of chipped brazil nuts, the data indicate that the price is substantially 
higher than in the case of broken nuts, and in some cases even approaches the price of 
whole nuts. 
On average, the price of chipped nuts is 90.18% of the price of whole nuts, though in 
some cases has reached an almost equal value. 
However, it is important to note that chipped nuts require additional processing, 
which adds slightly to the costs. 
In Peru, these forms of commercialisation (broken and chipped) are not well known or 
used (only one case being registered during the 10 years under consideration). 
Chipped nuts are the least frequently commercialised, probably on account of the 
increased cost component, and there are times when Amberwood has not marketed 
any nuts in this form (first quarter of 1998; January and March 1999). 
This entire analysis has so far only taken into account production arising from the 
same year, and not production from the previous or future years. 
However, these two patterns of selling are also utilised. Many companies sell 
(principally during the early months of the year) produce that is left over from last 
year's harvest. Similarly, they may commit production from the coming year 
(particularly if they have problems of financial liquidity). 
These two forms of selling are heavily penalised by the import companies and the 
disparity in negotiating conditions are well recognised by both parties23 . 
It is for this reason that they have not been taken into account in the current analysis. 
23 On the one hand, it is assumed that the quality (of last years produce) is less than optimum, while in 
the case of future production, the importers take advantage of the need for cash on the part of the sellers 
by paying a substantially lower price. 
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The following table shows the changes in the international price of chipped brazil 
nuts. 
BEHAVIOUR OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRICE 
FOR BROKEN BRAZIL NUTS 1990 - 1999 
Price %Variation 
US$ /Pound US$ /kg. SI. I kg. in US$ 
1990 0,81 1,78 0,37 
1991 0,85 1,87 1,44 4,94% 
1992 0,45 0,99 1,23 -47,06% 
1993 0,86 1,90 4,14 91,75% 
1994 1,13 2,48 5,41 30,77% 
1995 1,17 2,58 5,80 3,91% 
1996 1,31 2,89 6,90 11,94% 
1997 1,45 3,18 8,43 10,22% 
1998-I 1,37* 3,00 8,35 -5,65% 
1998-II 1,28 2,81 8,00 -6,47% 
1998-III 1,12 2,46 7,32 -12,27% 
1998-IV 1,01 2,22 6,82 -9,82% 
Jan-99 1,11 * 2,44 7,86 9,90% 
Feb-99 1,21 2,66 9,02 9,01% 
Mar-99 1,25* 2,74 9,26 2,89% 
Apr-99 1,28 
--
2_,_8~ L__ 9,43 2,81% 
* No information is available. The calculated value has been extrapolated 
using its limits. 
Sources: Peru en NUrn.eros 1999 I BCRP I AMBER WOOD TRADING LTD 
Author's interpretation 
8) Determinants of Price 
Brazil nuts play a marginal role in the world nut markets, in which they compete with 
14 other nuts. Their contribution represents only a small percentage of the total 
market, with a tendency to decrease. 
It can be stated that brazil nuts themselves have little demand, but are largely 
consumed in nut-mixes that are used in the chocolate and confectionery industries. 
For this reason, their price depends principally on two factors: 
• The price of other nuts, principally cashew from Central America, the Amazon, 
India and the Indo-China region (particularly Vietnam). In other words, regions 
of tropical humid forest. 
• The quantity available for sale, which depends on natural (wild) production24 
24 Many Bolivian companies, for example, take on high levels of debt which requires them to sell their 
future production at very low prices. Indirectly, this affects the market price (on account of the high 
proportion of production from Bolivia). 
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It is certain that there is a climate in developed countries within which consumption of 
brazil nuts could be stimulated, not only because of the ecological factors already 
mentioned, but also because it is an organic product. Nevertheless, fears concerning 
the possible carcinogenic affects of the aflotoxins which develop on the fruit are a 
serious constraint to the commercial promotion of this produces. 
2.s It is lrnown, for example, that peanuts are carcinogenic. 
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Appendix 4. Profit Margins Obtained By The Different Agents 
1) Collector [ Castanero] 
The castanero incurs a series of costs which are related either directly or indirectly to 
the extraction ofbrazil nuts. 
These costs can be classified according to the following groups: 
• Legal Costs 
• Preparation Costs (or Path Clearing ) and Costs of Extraction 
• Basic Living Expenses 
• Expenditure on Transport 
• Expenditure on Labour 
• Cost of Shelling 
• Expenditure on Labour 
Legal Costs 
As mentioned previously, all forest areas are the property of the Peruvian State, which 
allocates concessions to individuals in order that they can exploit them in a rational 
manner. 
Title holders of a concession are obliged to pay a series of expenses related to the 
acquisition of the rights to work the brazil nut resource. 
In theory, it is possible that "informal concessions" exist, although in this region 
virtually no cases of this are known. 
It can be claimed that 99% of the brazil nut areas exploited are legally registered with 
the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture. However, a problem which does occur with 
some frequency is "robbery". 
This refers to the actions of strangers who, in the absence of the rightful owner, enter 
a concession which is not their own to collect the brazil nuts. These "robbers" are in 
some cases individuals who are not normally even involved in brazil nut extraction, 
while in others they are title holders to neighbouring concessions. 
The problem occurs generally during the month of December, when the concessions 
are uninhabited. In order to reduce the time spent living in the forest, the concession 
holders often wait for the entire production of "coconuts" to fall (generally by mid-
January). However, despite incurring increased costs, many are now deciding to enter 
the forest earlier, suggesting that losses due to robbery may be substantial. This 
problem is generalised. 
The principal legal costs include the following: 
• Request to Renew the Contract 
• Contract of Concession Holder 
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• Guarantee of 20 % 
• Levy 
• Visual Inspection 
• Territorial Mapping 
It is not the intention of the current study to enter into this level of detail; for this 
reason, we provide only a brief description of each cost component. 
Firstly, the request to renew the contract as well as the contract itself carries a fixed 
costs of 34 soles. This is paid every two or five years26, except in the case of new 
contracts, which (on the first occasion) are given for only one year. 
In addition to this there is an annual levy. This levy is proportional to the volume of 
produce declared when forms are filled at the time of acquiring the concession 
contract, and is equivalent to 2% of the value of production (although, as indicated 
previously, there is considerable "underestimation", in the order of some 42%, in the 
volumes declared). Twenty percent of the levy must be paid at the start of harvest, 
while the remaining 80% is paid with the income received from the sale of the nuts. 
Finally, territorial mapping and visual inspection of concessions were extraordinary 
costs incurred in 1998, for activities which aimed to provide more realistic 
information. These costs were proportional the official size of the concessions and 
were equivalent to 0. 7 soles per hectare. 
For an average concession of 1000 ha (180 sacks, 3600 Kilos) the following costs are 
estimated: 
AVERAGE COMPOSITION OF LEGAL COSTS 
Total Cost Annual Cost 
Contract and renovation of contract1 34 soles 17 soles 
Concession levy 72 soles 72 soles 
Mapping and visual inspectionL 700 soles 70 soles 
Total legal costs 159 soles 
1 As the majority of contracts are given for a two year period, this value is used as 
the reference. 
2 It is assumed here (reasonably) that territorial mapping is conducted every 10 years 
(or, in its absence, that the Ministry introduces some new "extraordinary cost" for the 
castanero). 
Costs of Preparation (or Path Clearing) and Extraction Costs 
Rumbeo (path clearing) is the term used to describe the activity of locating brazil nut 
trees in a new area of forest which was previously unexplored and in which it is 
presumed there are clusters of suitable trees. 
26 In theory, the contracts can be extended for up to a 10 year period. In practice this does not occur as 
the Ministry of Agriculture tends to put forward too many objections and, furthermore, does not 
provide information on the possibility. 
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Individuals specialised in locating brazil nut trees (generally indigenous people) are 
contracted for this task. These individuals are known as "rumberos" or "materos". 
After locating the trees it is necessary to open roads (paths, tracks or roads) through 
the undergrowth to link the different trees. It is also necessary to construct a camp 
which acts as the centre of operations for the harvest. This camp is generally 
constructed on the banks of the river or alongside the main road. 
Some castaneros decide to construct payoles, or small, temporary deposits for the 
short-term storage of the sacks ofbrazil nuts. This generally occurs on the very large 
concessions (where there may even be 2 camps, one at each extreme). 
In the case of old, long established concessions, all that is required annually is repair 
of the camps (there is always some deterioration of the installations due to natural 
effects or human action27) and clearing of undergrowth that has grown onto the paths. 
Some castaneros carry out this work as a separate activity (in October or earlier, 
during the dry season, which facilitates the task). Other (and, increasingly, more) 
castaneros conduct repairs and path-clearing simultaneously or immediately before 
initiating the harvest, in order to save (at least) on transport costs. 
As preparation and extraction are fundamentally similar in that both imply "entering 
the forest", we can assume that the cost structure ofboth is also similar. 
Both entail: 
• Transport Costs (to enter and leave the concession; in the one case to leave while 
transporting the produce). There are many means of transport which can be used: 
• Own transport (canoe with a 16HP or 55HP motor; tractor; motorbike) 
• Rented transport 
• Transport service (public or company. Some companies, such as Candela Peni 
for example, provide this service free in the boats which enter to buy or collect 
committed produce28). 
• Expenditure on Labour. In the case of preparation of the concession, payment is 
generally on a daily rate; in the case of the harvest, payment is on a piece-work 
rate (i.e. by sack collected). In addition, some castaneros contract a woman to 
take charge ofthe cooking. 
• Living expenses29, which include: 
• Food30, essentially made up of oil, garlic, rice31 , sugar, coffee, onions, 
cigarettes, spices, preserved fish, flour (fermented cassava flour), beans and 
27 It is common to encounter cases where timber extractors have destroyed whole camps, using the 
wood as frrewood. 
28 This is an interesting proposal designed to establish more harmonious relationships between the 
different players. Advantage is taken of a cost that would otherwise be lost (as the journey would be 
made anyway, regardless of whether or not the boat was full or empty). 
29 In contrast to Bolivia, in Peru the tradition universally practised is for the concession holder to bear 
all the costs of food and other living expenses for the workers. 
30 Apart from local produce, all the remaining subsistence items have to be purchased. This entails 
financial expenditure before the start of the brazil nut harvest. 
31 Castaneros are increasingly cultivating rice themselves. This can allow relatively significant savings 
to be made on the money that has to be spent on the harvest. 
51 
other dried vegetables, flour, eggs, milk, potatoes, Quaker oats, powdered 
drinks (flavourings), salt, tea, vegetables, as well as local produce such as 
cassava, bananas and maize. 
• Work tools such as machetes, axes, plastic (to protect the brazil nuts from the 
frequent rain), sacks, and hard hats, among others. 
• Other accessories such as rifles and cartridges (for hunting animals, necessary 
to complement the diet32), torch batteries, kerosene (used as fuel for cooking), 
among others. 
• Medicines, principally anti-venom (to counteract venom from a variety of 
snakes), treatment of diarrhoea, fever, etc .. 
• In general, personal items for washing etc. are the responsibility of each 
individual. 
Based on information collected in the field, it was possible to calculate the average 
cost of each of these components. 
Using the same example used previously as a model, we have assumed that 180 sacks 
are extracted in 16 man-months (i.e. 4 men working for some 4 months). This 
generates the following information: 
COST STRUCTURE OF EXTRACTION (AND PREPARATION) 
Total Cost Cost per Sack 
Expenditure on Transport1 900 soles 5 soles 
Living Expenses.l 2520 soles 14 soles 
Expenditure on Labour 2700 soles 15 soles 
Total Expenditure on Extraction 6120 soles 34 soles 
Total Expenditure on Preparation,; 2106 soles 11.7 soles 
-
1. Transport costs vary according to 3 fundamental factors: (a) distance between the 
concession and Puerto Maldonado; (b) type of access to the concession - road or river; 
and (c) availability or not of own means of transport. For this point we have used an 
average value which is equivalent to the fee charged by public transport from the 
middle region ofthe Rio Pairumanu, the main brazil nut zone.33 . 
2 Cost of living expenses have been calculated using a cost per work-day of 
approximately 5 soles and the same length of stay assumed above (i.e. 4 people 
working for 4 months). Both figures were derived from information collected in the 
field. 
3 Using the same method, it is estimated that expenditure on preparation is 
approximately one third of the cost ofharvest. 
32 Normally, preserved fish is only taken for the journey or as a back-up in case hunting should be poor. 
Otherwise hunting for food is universal, and is of fundamental importance in order to reduce 
(substantially) the expenditure required on food. 
33 For more detail, the following information is given on transport fees charged by Candela Peru (in 
unit cost per sack) from the different brazil nut producing areas in Madre de Dios: Lago Valencia: 4.50 
SI.; Rio Las Piedras:7.70 SI.; Rio Pariarnarca:6.60 SI.; Rio Pariarnanu:4.80 SI.; Boca Pariarnanu: 4.00 
SI.; Pastora Grande: 1.80 SI.; Palrna Real: 3.50 SI.; Carretera a Iberia: 5.45 SI.. In reality, these fees 
should have fallen by some 20% as the cost of fuel (the principal component of transport costs) has 
fallen by 25% with the coming into force of the new law of promotion of the Amazon. 
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These expenditures have been calculated using real (though not ideal) data. Ideally, 
expenditure on extraction should amount to some 25 soles, according to calculations 
made in a model concession, and not the 46 soles calculated here. 
This information on the economic efficiently of the use of resources (only 54% 
efficient, approximately) is close to estimates given by other studies34, which obtained 
an average index of efficiency of 56%. 
This suggests that the conditions of poverty and indebtedness in which the majority of 
castaneros find themselves is largely the result of an inadequate use of financial 
resources, and concession-management which is not economically optimum, and 
which does not allow them to retain a significant net margin. In some cases, where 
the castanero has not been able to negotiate effectively and has been obliged to 
commit his produce unshelled, it is very probable that his "operational result" has 
been negative. In other words, working the concession can generate losses. 
This situation is certainly alleviated by the fact that some of these costs, in effect, do 
not occur (such as the depreciation of equipment, which is taken into account by 
Candela Peni). Also by the fact that some of these payments are "made" to the 
castanero himself, or to members of his family (for example, the functions of haulier 
or labourer - barriquero). 
This does not deny the fact that there are undoubtedly other components associated 
with the unequal negotiating positions between agents which, as we have seen, "help" 
to maintain this vicious circle in which the castaneros find themselves. 
There is a real concern on the part of castaneros to control the level of efficiency of 
the workers which they contract. 
One concrete form in which this can be seen is demonstrated by the following 
account. The price that had normally always been paid to the barriqueros (workers) 
for gathering, splitting and carrying the brazil nuts from the forest was 15 soles per 
sack, and no-one challenged this. 
Then one castanero decided to pay extra for increased efficiency. He began to pay 18 
soles per sack (20% more) to barriqueros who extracted two sacks per day, and up to 
20 soles per sack (33% more than the market average) to those who extracted three. 
Historically, it was believed that each worker extracted one sack per day, for which he 
was paid 15 soles. This novel proposal was received with much scepticism, and even 
rejection, by other castaneros, who considered the idea of paying more to the workers 
as totally hair-brained, particularly when the activity already generated such small 
profit margins. 
Others were very concerned that this practice would "spoil" the market and push the 
price for barriqueros even higher, at a time when many were actually trying to push 
the price down to 13 soles. 
34 AGREDA, Victor. Investigaci6n Socioecon6mica de la Actividad Castafiera en Madre de Dios. 
Candela Peru y Proyecto Conservando Castaiiales, June 1999. 
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Though the results of this strategy were never monitored systematically, there is no 
better proof of its success than the increasingly large band of followers that have 
adopted the idea. Today, during the final harvest of 1999, it is not unusual to find 
castaneros who require that their barriqueros extract at least two sacks per day in 
exchange for an extra payment (which the barriqueros have already learnt to 
demand). 
This agreement benefits both parties. The castaneros reduce the time spent in the 
concession, and thus save on the cost that this extra time implies. The barriqueros 
obtain more income in less time and are able, in some cases, to enter and work in 
other concessions35. 
Expenditure on Shelling 
The option exists for the castanero to carry out shelling himself, either using family 
labour (the most frequent choice) or contracted labour. 
In some cases, the task of shelling is carried out in the forest, while in others it is 
conducted in the family units in the city of Puerto Maldonado. The third option is to 
use the shelling service of one of. the companies, as described. 
In this section we will discuss only the first two of these options, as the third has 
already been covered at some length. 
When shelling is carried out in the forest, as well as paying in cash a previously 
agreed price for the work, the castanero carries the cost of food and lodgings for those 
contracted to undertake it. The rate paid is according to each Kilo of first grade nuts 
shelled, and this fluctuates from 0.80 S/. to 1.00 S/. 
The need for this is obvious, as there is no possibility once in the forest of obtaining 
food in any other way. The castanero tries (though does not always succeed) to 
compensate for the cost by paying a lower piece-work rate. 
When shelling is conducted in the capital, the castanero does not generally carry the 
cost of living expenses of those contracted, but pays 1.00 S/. for each Kilo of first 
grade nuts obtained. 
35 This is not a utopia. The harvest is a seasonal activity of only 3 months duration and it is generally 
believed that it is physically impossible to work in more than one concession at the same time. 
However, there are individuals (principally from the highlands in the South of the country) who 
emigrate temporarily to Madre de Dios to work in the brazil nut trade and accumulate a significant 
quantity of money, to which end they may work in 2-3 concessions. These individuals are among those 
most keen to increase their efficiency to a maximum. 
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Summary of Extraction Costs 
A summary of all average costs involved in extraction is given in the following table. 
PRINCIPAL COSTS INCURRED BY THE CASTANERO 
--- -· ~ r - - - ----, 
Total Cost Cost per Sack 
Legal Costs 159 soles 0.88 soles 
Expenditure on Preparation 2106 soles 11.7 soles 
Expenditure on Transport 900 soles 5 soles 
Expenditure on Labour 2700 soles 15 soles 
Living Expenses 2520 soles 14 soles 
Expenditure on Extraction 8385 soles 46.58 soles 
Expenditure on Shelling 3600 soles 20 soles 
Expenditure on Extraction and 11985 soles 66.58 soles 
Shelling 
Source: Field work 
Here we advance to the next point to consider the average transaction price this 
season36. This allows us to appreciate the extremely small profit margins obtained by 
the castaneros, particularly if they sell their nuts unshelled, and explains why 
castaneros are so keen to process the nuts themselves, as it allows them to retain a 
slightly increased margin. 
As detailed later, the average prices this season are as follows: 
PRICE OF BRAZIL NUTS IN PUERTO MALDONADO- 1999 
Free price1 Price for "Committed" 
Produce2 
Unshelled (by sack) 52.50 SI. 46.20 SI. 
Shelled (by Kilo of 151 grade 5.40 SI. 4.75 SI. 
nuts) 
1 This is the price obtained by the castanero in the marketplace when the 
product is sold free onto the market, and not given as partial payment against 
an advance (loan). 
2 This is the price of produce which is committed (for repayment of an 
advance/loan) and has suffered a penalty of 12% against the market price. 
Source: Field work. 
This can be used to estimate the profit (or loss) margins obtained by the castanero in 
each case. 
36 The estimated figures are based on information collected in the field and compiled for the current 
season (1999). The entire analysis will use this as the reference period, unless otherwise stated. 
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There are four possible scenarios: 
• Case 1 : When the castanero sells unshelled nuts which are not "committed" (as 
repayment) 
• Case 2: When the castanero "sells" unshelled nuts which are "committed". 
• Case 3: When the castanero sells shelled nuts which are not "committed" 
• Case 4: When the castanero "sells" shelled nuts which are "committed" 
The following table indicates the relative profitability of the activity for the castanero 
according to each of these situations. 
ANALYSIS OF PROFITABILITY FOR THE CASTANERO 
ACCORDING TO EACH POSSIBLE SCENARIO 
151 Case1 2na Case1 3ra Case2 
Extraction Costs 46.58 SI. 46.58 S/. 2.33 SI. 
Shelling Costs 0.00 SI. 0.00 SI. 1.00 SI. 
Total Costs (TC) 46.58 SI. 46.58 SI. 3.33 SI. 
Selling Price 52.50 SI. 46.20 SI. 5.40 SI. 
Profit Margin (PM) 5.92 SI. -0.38 SI. 2.07 SI. 
PM (in % of TC) 12.71% -0.82% 62.16% 
4th Case2 
2.33 SI. 
1.00 SI. 
3.33 SI. 
4.75 SI. 
1.42 S/. 
42.64% 
1 These figures are calculated for one unit ofunshelled produce= 70kg sack 
2 These figures are calculated for one unit of shelled produce = Kilo of 1st grade nuts 
Source: Field work 
The table clearly demonstrates that profit margins are significantly higher when the 
product is transformed from unshelled to shelled nuts. The very low profit margins 
obtained when the product is sold unshelled are also evident. 
There is negative net profit where castaneros commit the n~ts unshelled [as part of an 
advance/loan repayment]. 
Unfortunately, in reality the most frequent situations are cases 2 and 4. There are few 
castaneros who have sufficient savings to provide them with adequate working capital 
(at least initial capital). It is because of this that many castaneros agree to commit 
their produce unshelled, but end by repaying in shelled nuts. They give as 
justification their desire to clear their debts and thus maintain a relationship of trust 
with their sources of finance, something which is only possible if they can at least 
recuperate their investment. 
Some factors tend to alleviate the findings: 
3 Firstly, castaneros almost never commit their entire production, particularly if 
conditions are particularly disadvantageous. They generally only request (and 
receive) what is really necessary to enable them to enter the concession and 
begin harvest. The remaining money needed is obtained from the sale of the 
early production as it extracted. 
4 Secondly, as mentioned previously, many of the expenses shown are "shadow" 
costs; in other words, the expenditure is not actually made as the tasks are 
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conducted by the castanero himself or members of his direct family (i.e. 
unpaid family labour). In reality, therefore, total expenditure is less than that 
estimated in the above table. 
2) Habilitador 
From a technical standpoint, there is little substantial difference between the 
habilitadores and the traders. The only real difference lies in the commercial aspect. 
For the purpose of the analysis, we defme the habilitador as an individual who 
provides a cash advance to castaneros in exchange for the promise of their future 
production; the price of the future production is fixed at the moment of handing over 
the working capital. 
The "loan" agreement may cover either shelled or unshelled nuts. We have included 
both situations in the analysis, to estimate net profit margins for either form of the 
product. 
Traders also buy nuts from the castaneros either shelled or unshelled, but in this case 
the product is traded freely (i.e. it is not committed against an advance). For this 
reason, the sale price is the same as the market price at the time of making the 
transaction. 
Traditionally, the price pre-fixed by the habilitador has been lower than the price set 
by the trader. A recent stud~7 estimated that the difference between them fluctuated 
around a value of 12% less for the product committed to the habilitador. 
This value has been used as a basis for the analysis, in conjunction with the average 
[market] price of shelled and unshelled brazil nuts in Puerto Maldonado. The figures 
were taken from information collected in the field this year. 
Using the information provided above, we made the following calculations: 
PRICE OF BRAZIL NUTS IN PUERTO MALDONADO- 1999 
Market Price1 Price of Habilitador 2 
Unshelled (per sack) 52.50 SI. 46.20 SI. 
Shelled (per Kilo of 1St 5.40 SI. 4.75 SI. 
Grade) 
-~ 
1 This is the price used to calculate the costs of the trader. 
2 This price is calculated by subtracting 12% from the market price. 
Source: Field work 
Throughout the analysis, it is assumed that a yield of 20kg of first grade shelled nuts 
is obtained from each unit (sack) ofunshelled produce. 
The intermediary (habilitador or trader) may shell the nuts, or may market the product 
unshelled. 
37 AGREDA, Victor. Investigaci6n Socioecon6rnica de la Actividad Castafiera en Madre de Dios. 
Candela Peru y Proyecto Conservando Castaii.ales, June 1999 
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If the nuts are purchased unshelled, and sold unshelled, the profit is derived from the 
fact that the nuts are being purchased at a lower price (46.20 S/. or 4.75 S/., depending 
on whether the nuts are shelled or unshelled) and sold at the normal, market price 
(52.50 S/. or 5.40 S/.). 
If the nuts have been purchased unshelled, the habilitador or trader may decide to 
process the product and then sell them shelled and, in this way, obtain a greater net 
profit margin. 
In this case, new costs need to be incorporated into the analysis - specifically the costs 
of drying and shelling the product. 
COST OF "LOW TECHNOLOGY" PROCESSING 
OF THE BRAZIL NUTS 
Activity Unit Cost per Kilo of 1st Grade 
Drying and Handling 0.09 S/. 
Shelling 1.00 S/. 
TOTAL 1.09 S/. 
----- - -
Source: Field Work 
I 
This case refers to "low technology" processing of the brazil nuts, as distinct from the 
"high technology'' processing carried out, ideally, by the processing companies. 
Under "low technology" processing, drying is carried out in the sun on enormous 
platforms which fit up to 60 sacks of nuts. One worker is needed to transport the nuts 
to and from the platforms, stir and turn them to promote airing, and protect them from 
possible theft, for a period of approximately 7 days until the nuts are dry. The daily 
rate of a worker is approximately 15 soles and, if it is assumed that the 60 sacks yield 
1200 Kilos, the unit cost is calculated at 0.09 soles per Kilo of first grade nuts 
This is in contrast to processing by the castanero, where we have not added any 
expenditure for drying. This is because in the case of the habilitador (or trader) the 
process is on a considerably larger scale. The platforms are much larger, and the 
process requires special attention. This necessitates either contracting a worker, or 
that the intermediary (or family member) carries out the task himself38. 
In the case ofthe castanero, drying is carried out on a succession of small plots while, 
at the same time, a series of other (related or unrelated) activities are performed. In 
other words, the task does not imply additional costs or the dedication of any 
individual exclusively to complete the operation. 
The habilitadores normally have shelling machines similar to those used by the 
companies. However, in some cases they do not, and instead use sticks and stones to 
break the shells. 
38 As already indicated, all costs will be entered: remunerated and family members (not remunerated). 
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There is no differentiation in terms of payment of those carrying out the shelling 
(usually women), and the rate is 1.00 SI. per Kilo of 1st grade nuts shelled. 
The following table gives a summary of the costs, selling prices and profit margins for 
the habilitador. 
ANALYSIS OF PROFITABILITY FOR THE HABILITADOR 
IN EACH POSSIBLE CONTEXTUAL RELATIONSHIP 
1 sr Case1 2rur Cast? 3ro Cast? 
Cost of Raw Materials 46.20 SI. 
Processing Cost 0.00 SI. 
Total Cost (TC) 46.20 SI. 
Selling Price 52.50 SI. 
Profit Margin 6.30 SI. 
Profit Margin (in % of TC) 13.64% 
1st Case: The habilitador buys unshelled and sells unshelled 
2nd case: The habilitador buys unshelled and sells shelled 
3rd Case: The habilitador buys shelled and sells shelled 
2.31 SI. 
1.09 SI. 
3.40 SI. 
5.40 SI. 
2.00 SI. 
58.82% 
1 The figures are calculated per unit ofunshelled product= sack of70 kg. 
4.75 SI. 
0.00 SI. 
4.75 SI. 
5.40 SI. 
0.65 SI. 
13.68% 
2 The figures are calculated per unit of shelled product = Kilo of 1st grade nuts 
Source: Field Work 
In this case it can be seen that the levels of profit are, normally, positive in all cases, 
although slightly lower than those obtained, in some very specific cases, by the 
castanero. 
3) Trader 
In the case of the trader, as noted earlier, the price at which he purchases is the market 
price, and the same is also true for the selling price. For this reason, we analyse only 
one case: that in which the trader conducts processing of the nuts in his "low 
technology" units. In the other cases previously considered, there would [in theory] 
be no profit margin39. 
In reality, however, the latter situations are observed; i.e. the purchase and sale of the 
product in the same form (shelled or unshelled). 
This generally occurs when the trader buys the nuts in the concessions and sells them 
in the city of Puerto Maldonado. Factors that need to be taken into account in these 
cases include the following: 
• His transport costs must be reduced to levels below those charged by the 
companies or public transport units. 
• He must take advantage of the lack of (or wrong) information held by castaneros 
(while they are in the forest) about the current price situation. 
39 When he buys the product shelled and sells it shelled and when he buys unshelled and sells 
unshelled. In each case, the purchase and selling prices would be the same. 
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• He buys sensing that the price will soon increase, thus providing him with his 
profit margin. 
Except for the last case, in which there is a certain element of risk, the first two cases 
provide a secure (though perhaps small) profit. 
As these cases are unusual, they are not considered here and the analysis focuses on 
the case of the trader who buys nuts unshelled at the market price, and then sells them 
shelled, again at the market price. 
ANALYSIS OF PROFITABILITY FOR THE TRADER 
IN EACH POSSIBLE CONTEXTUAL RELATIONSHIP 
Sole Case* 
Cost of Raw Materials 2.63 SI. 
Processing Cost 1.09 SI. 
Total Cost (TC) 3.72 SI. 
Selling price 5.40 SI. 
Profit Margin 1.68 SI. 
Profit Margin (in % of TC) 45.36% 
* This refers to the trader who buys unshelled nuts at the market price, 
processes them, and then sells them shelled, again at the market price. The 
figures are calculated per unit ofunshelled product= sack of70 kg. 
Source: Field Work 
As can be seen, the profit margin of the trader is less than that of the habilitador for a 
similar situation. However, the trader has the advantage that his profit is secure, while 
the habilitador runs the risk that the indebted castanero does not repay his debt. 
This is without mentioning the fmancial cost to the habilitador of having his capital 
tied up by a third party, without being able to move it, without charging any rate of 
interest, and for a period oftime which is uncertain, but not less than two months. 
4) Processing and Export Companies 
It is important here to make the qualitative distinction between a processing company 
and an export company. 
A processing company is one which has the buildings and equipment required to 
process (dry and shell) brazil nuts in a manner which is centralised and "modernised". 
A company which merely exports does not have these facilities, and generally has 
access to relatively small buildings which are sufficient only to store shelled nuts 
temporarily between purchase and transport to the place of export. These companies 
also employ considerably fewer labourers. 
Although both fall within the category of "exporters", their fixed and variable costs 
are very different, also their possibilities of working and of generating aggregated 
value. 
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A processing company can purchase either shelled or unshelled produce. An export 
company can buy only shelled nuts. The impact of both on the price and the market, 
also their margin of manoeuvrability under different economic situations, are also 
variable- in prejudice ofthe latter [the export company]. 
The following table shows in detail the principal expenditures which are incurred 
during the final phases of the chain: handling of the product, processing, transport to 
the final destination before export, selection, and packing; as well as administrative 
and marketing costs40. 
PRINCIPAL COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMPANY 
.41 
--- -- ,. . 
' 
Processing Export 
Company Company 
Drying (using modem equipment) 0.15 S/. 0.00 S/. 
Shelling (using modem equipment) 1.00 S/. 0.00 S/. 
Handling 0.17 S/. 0.03 S/. 
Packing and transport to Lima 1.76 S/. 1.76 S/. 
Selection according to size 0.17 S/. 0.17 S/. 
and [exportable] quality 
Packing and wrapping for export 0.12 S/. 0.12 S/. 
Administrative costs 1.95 S/. 0.83 S/. 
Marketing costs 0.60 S/. 0.42 S/. 
TOTAL 4.77 S/. 3.31 S/. 
-
Source: Candela Peru 
A calculation was made using internal data from Candela Peru, by deducting 
expenditures not relevant in companies without their own processing plant. 
The following section details the fundamental differences between these two types of 
company. 
These differences can be classed into 3 groups: 
• Handling 
• Expenditure on administration 
• Expenditure on marketing 
We indicated previously the difference between the more modem "high technology" 
drying conducted by the processing companies, and the "low technology" drying 
which was described under the analysis of the habilitador. 
In the case of the companies, there are two types of drying: 
40 These costs (as well as cost relating to the castanero) are given in detail in the relevant annexes. 
41 For practical purposes, we use synonymously the categories of "first grade brazil nuts" and "export 
quality brazil nuts". However, in reality, only some 80% of nuts marketed in Puerto Maldonado as first 
grade are actually of export quality. 
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i 
I 
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• Drying of the nuts in-shell in an oven which is either oil fired, or uses as fuel 
firewood such as brazil nut "coconuts" or even discarded shells (for example) 
• Drying ofthe shelled nuts in an oven which runs on electricity. 
The unit cost calculated by Candela Peni for each type of dryer is approximately 
US$0.05, which takes into account the cost of electricity and fuel (the firewood is 
obviously free). 
We will now consider the differences that exist within the three components 
mentioned above. 
Expenditure on Handling 
As mentioned earlier, an export company requires far fewer labouring staff. The only 
work involved includes the airing of the shelled nuts, and packing and transport for 
carriage to Lima or Arequipa (the only two departure points for final export of the 
product). In general, this requires only one labourer, in contrast to the case of 
Candela Peni which, in 1998, contracted 5 labourers. 
If this figure is taken as average for the number of labourers employed by the 
processing companies, an estimate can be made of the unit costs for handling in the 
[purely] export companies by dividing the unit costs of handling in the former by 5. 
Expenditure on Administration 
For the purposes of the analysis, the following employees have not been included [in 
the case of export companies]: head of the plant, administrative assistant, plant 
assistant, assistant accountant and watchman. The only costs retained were for the 
administrative director, collection co-ordinator, and head of selection. 
Similarly, expenditure on other components has also been reduced including 
reparation and maintenance of the plant, water and electricity, vehicle and fuel, office 
equipment, cleaning equipment, other consumables, sacks, depreciation and rent. 
These have been reduced to levels which are appropriate for a construction which is 
much smaller and functions purely as a store. These aspects are covered in detail in 
the relevant annex. 
Expenditure on Marketing 
Finally, in considering expenditure on commercialisation, we have reduced by 25% 
the high salary paid to the director of the plant in Lima, and we have eliminated costs 
of travel and subsistence. 
Summary 
With these modifications, we can conduct an analysis of the profitability of these two 
types of company. The analysis assumes the FOB export price to be US$1.39 per 
Pound, which is equivalent in local currency to 10.18 new soles per Kilo of shelled 
nuts of export quality. 
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The analysis was conducted for the following situations: 
• Case 1: When a processing company buys unshelled produce 
• Case 2: When a processing company buys shelled produce 
• Case 3: When an export company buys shelled produce 
In these three cases, we have assumed that the company pays the market price. 
Almost all companies function simultaneously as lenders (habilitadores) and buyers, 
as explained earlier. 
In the first instance, we consider the case of companies that buy on the open market, 
at market prices. 
ANALYSIS OF THE PROFITABILITY OF TRADING COMPANIES IN EACH 
POSSIBLE CONTEXTUAL RELATIONSHIP 
Case 1 Case2 Case 3 
Purchase price 2.63 S/. 5.40 S/. 5.40 S/. 
Cost of shelling 1.15 S/. 0.00 S/. 0.00 S/. 
Business costs* 4.77 S/. 4.77 S/. 3.31 S/. i 
Total costs (TC) 8.55 S/. 10.17 S/. 8.71 S/. I 
Selling price 10.18 S/. 10.18 S/. 10.18 S/. I 
Profit margin 1.63 S/. 0.01 S/. 1.47 S/. I 
Profit margin (as% ofTC) 19.13% 0.10% 16.88% 1 
* Business costs include all expenses detailed in the earlier table on costs attributed to 
the companies. 
Source: Field work 
The low profit margin obtained when a processing company buys shelled nuts (or 
offers a shelling service, which is virtually the same) is surprising. 
It is important to note that the cost structure of Candela Peru contains some expenses 
which are unusual and not characteristic of all companies. This can be seen in the 
details given. We do not pretend to comment on which of these costs actually 
correspond to its activities as an exporter (i.e. which expenditures are made 
efficiently, and which not). 
The following table presents information on the profitability of companies that 
function as habilitadores. All the information and tools necessary for the analysis 
were already available (it was necessary only to modify the value assigned to the 
purchase price). 
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ANALYSIS OF PROFITABILITY OF COMPANIES ACTING AS LENDERS 
,-------- ---- -.------- --------- ·----- ------------ ·---
Case 1 Case2 Case 3 
Purchase price 2.31 SI. 4.75 SI. 4.75 SI. 
Cost of shelling 1.15 SI. 0.00 SI. 0.00 SI. 
Business costs* 4.77 SI. 4.77 SI. 3.31 SI. 
Total costs (TC) 8.23 SI. 9.52 SI. 8.06 SI. 
Selling price 10.18 SI. 10.18 SI. 10.18 SI. 
Profit margin 1.95 SI. 0.66 SI. 2.12 SI. 
Profit margin (as% ofTC) 23.69% 6.93% 26.30% 
- -- ---
* Business costs include all expenses detailed in the earlier table on costs attributed to 
the companies. 
Source: Field work 
In reality, a company normally uses both forms of operating. Part of their capital is 
invested in obtaining future produce, and this provides them with a relatively greater 
profit margin. Their remaining capital is retained in order to diversify their portfolio 
of(types of) clients, and reduce their level ofrisk. 
Appendix 5. Brazil Nut Grades 
Brazil nuts are graded according to size (nuts to the lb ). 
In shell they are classified as: 
Extra large (40 to 45 nutsllb) -large (45 to 50 nutsllb)- medium (55 to 60 nutsllb). 
Shelled nuts, referred to as kernels, are classified as: 
Large (90 to 110 nutsllb) - medium (110 to 130 nutsllb) - small (140 to 160 
nutsllb)- midget (160 to 180nutsllb)- tiny (180 to 220 nutllb). 
There is also a classification for broken and chipped kernels. 
Quality standards relate particularly to moisture content which if too high can result in 
moulds which result in aflotoxins. Europe, a major market, has strict aflotoxin quality 
standards. 
With regard to quality in general, in addition to mould, rodent damage, moth 
infestation are also considerable problems at the origin processing plants prior to 
vacuum packing. 
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